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A report revealed from a motion I put into the Senate, that the government kept a helicopter flying for more than 5 years with a defective engine part.

That MRH-90 helicopter that crashed in Jervis Bay without any fatalities was a stroke of luck. Four months later, another helicopter crashed in the Whitsundays, resulting in the death of four Defence personnel. This report reveals that senior “leadership” of Defence was willing to put people’s lives at risk with defective engine parts. The question must be asked – how many other risks were they willing to overlook or explain away?

One Nation backs our Defence Personnel.  The Government can’t claim they do unless they hold senior members of the Defence Department accountable for their failures.

Transcript

I rise to speak on the document produced in response to order for the production of documents No. 200. This order relates to the MRH-90 Taipan helicopter crash in Jervis Bay in May 2023. The helicopter call sign Bushman 82 was hovering low to water on a training exercise, with divers suspended below, when it experienced a catastrophic failure of its left-hand engine. The helicopter ditched into the water—in a stroke of luck, without any fatalities. Just one month later, Defence gave the MRH-90 helicopter a completely clean bill of health and authorised it to continue flying. The Senate agreed to this OPD in May 2023, requiring Defence to hand over any safety reports and documents in relation to the crash. We wanted to know how Defence had certified the helicopter as safe so quickly after such a significant incident. In defiance of the order of this Senate, the Minister for Defence refused to hand over any documents, citing an ongoing internal investigation, despite the helicopter already being back in the air, threatening lives. The government and Defence advised that that investigation should conclude in October 2023. 

In June 2023, a month after, the Senate reiterated its order for the documents in motion 243, with a new deadline of November in accordance with the advice of the government. We gave them a go. They failed to produce even a response to that order until the Senate sought an explanation in December of 2023. We can see how time marches on and is irrelevant to Defence. 

Now we fast forward to September 2024, 18 months after the crash and nearly a year after the government promised to respond. We finally have a response and documents, yet it is not a compliant response. It’s a redacted version of an executive summary to a single report. The order very clearly specified ‘all incident reports, safety evaluations, briefing notes, correspondence and information held by the Department of Defence, the defence minister or the defence minister’s office’. The executive summary to one report clearly doesn’t satisfy this request. 

Minister, where are your briefing notes? Where is your correspondence? Are you telling the Senate that you and your office had nothing to say about the Jervis Bay ditching? The executive summary is dated 2 August 2024. That’s three months and two weeks ago. Did Defence sit on this report before giving it to the minister? Why the delay? The six pages of redacted executive summary we do have are from the Defence Flight Safety Bureau’s aviation safety investigation report. From what we do have, a few things are clear: 

The engine failure was caused by the rupture of Blade 34 from the High Pressure 1 (HP1) wheel in the High Pressure Turbine (HPT). 

They know the cause. Another quote reads: 

… in 2017, as a result of several HP1 failures across the global fleet, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) issued a NH90 Service Bulletin recommending that operators … replace HP 1 blades with modified blades. 

Another quote reads: 

The investigation highlighted that there was no definitive evidence of the completion and recording of hazard analysis and safety risk assessments related to HP 1 failures during MRH-90 PCS operations. 

Defence decided to keep flying the helicopters without the modified parts and eventually get around to it while failing to consider and document the risk that these things would lose an engine during low-level flight because of this. In 2023, five years after the bulletin was given to Defence, Bushman 82 was still flying in Jervis Bay, without the recommended modified parts. 

This report, while not compliant with the Senate’s order, is important because it again demonstrates Defence was willing to overlook serious risks when it came to this helicopter—risks involving lives. How many other problems with the MRH-90 helicopter did Defence overlook? How many times did they allow this thing back in the air, knowing it would unnecessarily put our defence personnel at needless risk? How many potentially catastrophic issues, like the TopOwl headset, were supposedly mitigated or did Defence just explain away? 

These documents are important because this helicopter should have been pulled from service a decade ago. The MRH-90 should have been permanently grounded after Bushman 82 ditched into Jervis Bay—the latest, at the time, of a series of incidents. It wasn’t pulled from service, and, four months later, Bushman 83 crashed in the Whitsundays, resulting in the death of four personnel: Warrant Officer Class 2 Joseph Phillip Laycock—Phil, as he was known; troop commander Captain Danniel Lyon; Lieutenant Maxwell Nugent; and Corporal Alexander Naggs. May they rest in peace. Blood is on the hands of the Defence leadership and successive defence ministers who kept this helicopter in the air when it belonged on the ground. I seek leave to continue my remarks later. 

Leave granted; debate adjourned. 

News Article from The Australian

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