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Senate Estimates | Australian Electoral Commission

I spoke with the Tom Rogers of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) about the recent referendum and how the same shade of purple was used by the ‘Yes’ campaign.

One Nation calls on the Special Minister of State, Senator Farrell to introduce legislation to grant the AEC control over their own colourway, to prevent attempts to confuse voters in the next election or referendum.

I also asked about the failure to include the entire proposed change to the Constitution on the ballot paper, as required by S128 of the Constitution. Mr Rogers’ answer was not acceptable.

I call on the Minister to clarify this Constitutional provision by enacting legislation to require the full text of the amendment to be included on future referendum voting papers.

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you. Firstly, Mr Rogers, thank you very much and congratulations on a successful referendum. You produced an accurate result and very quickly. I want to pass on comments from a
friend of mine who is fairly fussy and interested in accuracy. He volunteered to be one of your workers. He said the process of training and running the booth was first class. He had no problems, and he’s a fussy bugger. We do question the format of the ballot paper, but that’s history now. I wouldn’t take it personally about getting some nice messages. I think, after the last three years of the COVID response and the confusion around some of the Voice campaign, people are sick and tired of governments, so it wasn’t directed at you. I also noticed that ticks and crosses weren’t a thing. A Queanbeyan booth had 1,281 votes. Only one of those was a cross, and there were no ticks. However, in forms completed at the booth for declaration voting, I believe the elector was required to indicate their answer with a cross.

Chair: So no cause for conspiracy theory, then, but I’m interjecting.

Senator ROBERTS: Not at all. But please consider eliminating ticks and crosses from your own paperwork as a way of ensuring they are not used on polling day. That’s just a suggestion from one of the constituents. In the referendum, the Australian Electoral Commission allowed the use of AEC purple by the ‘yes’ campaign. That decision was correct in law, but let’s review that for the next time. Is that possible?

Mr Rogers: I might just talk about the purple signs issue because it’s a complex matter. We don’t own the colour purple. Legislatively, the AEC does not own the colour purple. I wish we did. I’d be very happy—

Senator ROBERTS: Despite the tie!

Mr Rogers: Indeed. There are only limited circumstances in which we can intervene with the use of the colour purple. In a lot of commentary that we saw both online and in the media, there’s this sort of thing about,
‘Oh my god, there are purple signs, and the AEC’s not doing anything about it.’ When you’re doing something like a short-form radio interview or a TV interview, it’s very hard to say, ‘Let us take you through the half hour of complexity of case law and legislation about this issue and why we don’t have power to do it.’ People just want to know about purple signs. Before the referendum, in fact I think before the last election, we’d made clear we would prefer that campaigners and parties do not use the colour purple. But that’s a legislative matter, and that would be a matter for parliament rather than for the AEC. But I can tell you that, wherever purple signs were deployed in those circumstances where we thought they would breach the legislation, we asked for those signs to be moved. By and large they were and in a fairly timely manner. We are satisfied with that, but again I make a plea to parties and campaigners in the future: please avoid the colour purple with white writing.

Senator ROBERTS: Was there a ruling regarding Josh Frydenberg’s campaign using purple with Chinese people?

Mr Rogers: There was a court case—Garbett v Liu—and, from memory, it found in very limited circumstances where the sign is indeed in purple with white writing, where that sign is placed in very close proximity to an ACC sign, almost next to it, and, as the third element, where it contains a message which says, ‘The right way to vote is X,’ it may breach the legislation. It’s that specific.

Senator ROBERTS: It is fairly specific. Thank you. Simon Frost worked for the ‘yes’ campaign in the area that created those deliberately misleading purple signs. Those signs did not pass the pub test, as I think you are implying. I also understand that Simon Frost worked for former treasurer Josh Frydenberg’s campaign. He was a senior adviser. Is there any comment there? It’s difficult.

Mr Rogers: No. As I’ve said, where those signs popped up, where we thought they were at risk of breaching the legislation, we took action. But we don’t own the colour purple and have no mandate over it.

Senator ROBERTS: So you’d support it if we put forward legislation on that?

Mr Rogers: Whatever bill passes through parliament is legislation I support in any case.

Mr Pope: We’d certainly welcome further clarification and widening of section 329, which I think is at the heart of your questioning.

Senator ROBERTS: The ballot paper, as I said a little while ago—we disagreed on that—did not include a full reproduction of the proposed change to the Constitution, as required by section 128 of the Constitution. I
understand that you don’t agree it has to be presented accurately in full and that the short description is sufficient. Is that still your position?

Mr Rogers: I understand that the argument was put by a legal academic in South Australia. I point out that this is absolutely a matter for the Attorney-General’s Department, not the AEC, but for the record I also note that a large number of other scholars dismissed that particular interpretation. For the record so that people understand: the form of the ballot paper followed exactly the form of the ballot paper in the legislation. The matter you are talking about is more of a constitutional and legal issue to be resolved by others, not by us.

Senator ROBERTS: Yes. As I understand—but I’m not a legal expert—the Constitution takes precedence over any legislation. Have you sought legal advice on that issue?

Mr Rogers: No, because that’s not my issue.

Senator ROBERTS: Attorney-General.

Mr Rogers: I have a number of other issues. I don’t need that one as well. But that would be the Attorney-General’s.

Senator ROBERTS: The Kennedy prepoll voting centre in Cairns was located in a shop in a shopping centre. Centre management initially refused both sides permission to hand out how-to-vote cards and display signage, instead offering a location off their property and down the street. As owners of the property, this is their prerogative, except the point of doing that was to set stalls in front of the voting centre for the bargain price of $250 a day, so they made a deal out of it. ‘Yes’ took up the offer, allowing them to position copious signage and poll workers in front of the prepoll voting centre. ‘No’ didn’t have the money and were prevented from handing out. Is it okay to have that operation of poll workers controlled by a private shopping centre management company?

Mr Rogers: It’s not actually unusual for this sort of thing to occur. I was saying before to Senator Liddle, we get four weeks notice to find whatever venues they can. They have to meet certain criteria as well, as you know. You have to have a number that have access for disabled Australians, and there are a range of other requirements such as security, so the number of venues that we get to choose from is quite small. Occasionally it comes down to either taking that one or there being no polling premises in that area. Occasionally, we’ve noticed before in certain large shopping centres and in airports when we’ve used those, there’s no ability for political parties to hand out material. We do try to advocate on behalf of the parties. As I said at the very start of my opening statement, we think scrutineers and campaigners play an important part in the process, but there will always be the odd event where the parties are unable to gain access rather than us arranging it. That was one of those very unfortunate circumstances. Of the over 7,000 polling places, there may have been only one or two that were like that.

Senator ROBERTS: Surely there’s a benefit for the shopping centre because your voting booth becomes a draw card for them. Can there be something written into the contract?

Mr Rogers: Sadly, I know that shopping centre—in fact, I think I visited that place last week, and I know Mr Pope has found some other issues up there as well and tried to secure polling premises, but it was difficult.

Chair: Can you write that into the contract?

Mr Rogers: Some of them will not write that into the contract. They say, ‘Either you sign the contract that we’re providing you or you or go somewhere else.’ I know that’s complex—

Mr Pope: I think we could suggest.

Mr Rogers: And we do suggest. With that particular one, I understand, we did try to work with the centre management, and they flat-out refused.

Chair: Can you perhaps write it into their legal obligations?

Mr Rogers: They won’t sign it.

Senator ROBERTS: It’s a free world. Finally, the AEC has been criticised for responding to a question from a voter with regard to what happens to a voter if he votes twice? The response was accurate: that, well, you just count them. Could that have been more sensitively done in the sense of, ‘Well, we have to count them, but have precautions to make sure people don’t vote twice’? In hindsight it’s always easy.

Mr Rogers: Actually, I do have a view of this. I’m conscious of time, but I think I mentioned before that we were tagged in 145,000 comments in social media in the middle of delivering a referendum. We were trying to serve information to the community as quickly as possible. As you yourself said, that was highly accurate. But it was picked up by a few individuals and weaponised deliberately to try and denigrate Australia’s electoral system. I don’t understand why you’d do that. The electoral system isn’t owned by the AEC; it’s owned by all Australians. I was reflecting the other day on a section of the act—I think it’s 365—which contains a piece of information that, effectively, immaterial errors shouldn’t vitiate an election outcome. It was put in there by smart people. It says, effectively, elections are complex and minor issues shouldn’t be used in any way to denigrate election outcomes. What we’ve seen is that there are a few dedicated individuals online who want to pick up the most minor of issues and create it as a huge event to try to undercut citizens’ trust in electoral outcomes. Let me tell you that, going back in time, we’d do exactly the same thing because it was an accurate answer. What I can’t control is the manner in which people react. As I read out earlier—and I’ve read out two per cent of some of the nutty stuff that barrels down at us, where people seize on the most minor of issues. The whole thing we’ve said before about Dominion voting machines, which emerged again at this—we even had groups of people standing outside at least one polling place in Melbourne in an organised way, handing out pens to voters who were going in, saying, ‘The AEC are going to rub your votes out.’ It’s insane. I don’t know where this comes from. I never thought I’d see this sort of thing in Australia where these minor issues about one comment on a social media page are then used to weaponise such a ridiculous thing.

I’m sorry for the long answer, but I’m very proud of the work that our social media team did in serving up information to Australians in such a timely and informative fashion. I read out some statistics before about our
overarching awareness campaign. It was the biggest campaign we’ve run. I’m very proud of that. I’m proud of the work that our individuals do. I know you know this, but our social media team and the AEC in particular have copped a torrent of abuse from idiots online who should know better, including threats to our staff, including death threats to our staff. It is utterly ridiculous. I’m sorry for using that as a vehicle to point out that our staff do a great job, our social media team do a great job and I’m extraordinarily proud of the work that they do.

Senator ROBERTS: Fortunately, the number of people who do that is very small. Sometimes they get magnified. It’s just that some people latch on to what you didn’t say, which was that we have adequate precautions
to make sure people don’t vote twice. That’s all I’m suggesting.

Mr Rogers: That actually was put there; but, again, I am just pointing out that these minor issues are occasionally blown out of all proportion. I’m also just using that—and I know you won’t mind, because our staff
are so good—to thank our staff who put up with some of that abuse that they get on a very regular basis.

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Australian Electoral Commission and the Colour Purple

Next week the Senate will vote on my motion to refer two matters that came out of the recent referendum to the Joint Standing Committee on Election Matters.

The first is about the misappropriation of the purple colour used by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). It confuses people and should be available to the AEC only. Even the AEC Commissioner is asking for protection on the purple they use.

Secondly, we need to clarify the words that should appear on a referendum ballot paper includes the full text of the amendment. This is in keeping with the wording of the Constitution.

Please share this video among your family and friends, call or email your Senators, and let’s get these loopholes tightened up for the sake of future confidence in our elections.

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Election Integrity FAQ

We receive many questions about the integrity of elections and observations from members of the public and volunteers at polling booths.

We investigated the many concerns that people have and provide answers to the most common questions asked.

If you have further questions, please feel free to contact us.


Click Here for FAQ

Q1: The count for elections and referendums is undertaken by over 100,000+ temporary election workers. Is it possible that political activists can work their way into responsible positions in the AEC to interfere with ballot box content? 

A1: This is true, however the degree by which this affects the result is likely to be small, if at all, for two reasons: 

(a) The ability to make a significant change in results is limited by AEC procedures. 

(b) Activist involvement is compensatory. This means one party may influence a booth in one location, whereas an opposing party will do the same elsewhere. This is not ideal but it renders such fraud pointless, which is why little actual proof exists of such things occurring. 

Q2: The AEC claims its processes are open and transparent. Surely this can only be true if all staff are honest, which in the present highly charged political environment is unlikely. Is election integrity being assessed on a staff basis? 

A2: The behaviour of the AEC over the three years my team has been scrutinising their operations is anything BUT open and transparent. It is because the AEC refuse to answer in a full and honest manner that there is a lack of confidence in their operation. 

In a booth of any significant size however, the AEC staff are most likely to keep each other honest because of those competing political sympathies.  

We do not believe the integrity issue is a staff-based one, rather the issue is in their systems and specifically the quality of the voter roll and security over ballots and electronic records during counting. 

Q3: AEC supervisors leave temporary election workers without direct monitoring despite claims by the AEC that this does not occur. Supervisors are seen chatting outside polling stations leaving temp staff unsupervised. Why is this not addressed? 

A3: It would be unlikely that the booth Supervisor was the only experienced person there, however any specific examples of this should be reported to the AEC here. If no suitable response is received, please let us know via contact us.

Q4: An AEC supervisor was seen with a bundle of ballot-box sealing zip-ties all with the same serial number and was seen taking ballot boxes home from the pre-poll. Why are they getting away with this? 

A4: Zip-tie numbers are logged and, we are told, reconciled. There should only be one number per box and numbers should only be used once. Anyone with specific information to prove otherwise are invited to contact our office via contact us

Transport of ballots in private vehicles is allowed by the legislation, but it is our view that it should not be happening. Secure transport should be used and this secure transport should include time logs and surveillance cameras on the cargo, with point-to-point transit. 

Q5: Auditing means the count is undertaken at least twice and is done by different counting teams. What if the ballots were swapped for different ballots on the kitchen table of an activist employee’s home when the pre-poll closed for the night? That is still a rigged election, isn’t it? 

A5: The initial count is compared back to the final count by the AEC and party scrutineers. There is no evidence of a major variance capable of affecting a House of Reps or Senate outcome. Indeed, the closer the electorate the more effective the scrutineer system becomes. 

One Nation has not received any proof such rigging is happening. If you have any information that proves otherwise, this can be provided to the AEC here. If no suitable response is received, please let us know via contact us,

As a general discussion though – can ballot boxes go astray and ballots be substituted? Theoretically this is possible given that ballot boxes are not securely transported and the quality of the seals is an issue. One Nation supports secure, point-to-point transport in a vehicle with video and GPS surveillance to remove any chance of ballot substitution. 

Q6: The AEC’s rigorous chain-of-custody mechanisms are open to abuse, as the last pre-poll supervisor out of the building can simply double back and load up his private car with sealed ballot boxes. 

A6: One Nation has not received any proof this is happening. If you have any information that proves otherwise, this can be provided to the AEC here. If no suitable response is received, please let us know via contact us.

We believe video surveillance and alarms with a check on “arm” and “disarm” times should be the absolute minimum requirement for a secure pre-poll or regional counting centre. We use the same venues election after election, so the cost of this is justified by the magnitude of the task these venues perform. 

Q7: Although all AEC staff are required to sign a declaration of political neutrality, this in reality means nothing. Activists don’t care about declarations, contracts, laws, fairness, justice, or the will of the people. Is there a way to ensure no activists are employed during the election? 

A7: It is not possible to find 100,000+ poll workers with no political allegiance. What matters is a multi-faceted secure system to ensure political loyalty does not affect their work.  

In my early days in the workforce I received some great advice about security – ‘opportunity creates its own temptation’. It is a basic responsibility of management to ensure staff are protected by removing temptation from them.  

We do not believe the AEC has done this to a sufficient degree. 

Q8: The AEC systems are incredibly easy for activist employees to defeat because the security is far too weak. How can this be improved? 

A8: The AEC provides many layers of security and integrity in their processes. Recent legislation, which was authored by One Nation and passed by the LNP Government, added auditing of the count and auditing of the computer system to eliminate computer fraud. These were important reforms. 

One Nation will pursue video and alarm surveillance of pre-polls and regional counting centres, an audit of the voter rolls and secure transport of ballot boxes. More detail on this can be found in this FAQ. 

Q9: Can procedural changes be made that ensure only Australian citizens vote and they vote only once, that ballots cannot be swapped once lodged and that the ballots are properly counted? 

A9: This is already a requirement of our law. The question is to what degree is the law being complied with? In practice, this would require an audit of the voter roll (which One Nation is calling for) to ensure accurate rolls.

Voter ID is essential to voting integrity.

Refer to answers 4 and 6 above around ballot security and transport.

One Nation believes the actual count itself is conducted as accurately as is possible, given the issues that arise around human error on the part of counting staff and voters. This is often made worse by the shocking state of some returned ballots.

Q10: Would it be better if voting was paper only, in person, with ID and on the day? 

A10: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. If pre-poll is conducted properly, it is not an issue for voting integrity. We have some concerns around current pre-poll systems – refer to answers above.

One Nation would like the AEC to take a serious look at blockchain-based online voting. There are some University Academics who propose a very good way for this to be done without the possibility of fraud. 

Q11: Could postal votes be restricted to those that are overseas, in hospital or care homes, with all ballots to be received by election day? 

A11: Postal voting needs to be replaced as soon as possible with secure online voting. There are ways to do that accurately and without opening the door to fraud. 

Q12: Current ballot boxes are not fit for purpose. What would it take to ensure ballot boxes are large, heavy and constructed of transparent material, kept under strong lights, continually videoed online, stored in the National Archive for any citizen to access in the future, and under constant observation by party scrutineers and members of the public? 

A12: The cardboard boxes you place your ballot in are not used to transport ballots. Once full, they are switched out to sealed, transparent plastic containers. This is safe to transport, however One Nation are still investigating issues around the accuracy and tamper-proof capacity of the seals, current use of private cars to transport ballots instead of secure transport, alarms and video monitoring of pre-poll and regional counting centres.  

Q13: How can we provide a system where the ballots must be counted with the same uninterrupted security and scrutiny, and continue until finalised? 

A13: This is just not workable. Many voting places are school buildings which need to be accessible for teaching staff and children on the Monday. The use of regional voting centres is necessary. Counting 24/7 is expensive and it may be very hard to find staff willing to do that. 

An accurate count relies on accurate systems with foolproof security, not continuous count. 

Q14: Wouldn’t it be better for elections if computers or scanners were not used in the counting, tallying, or reporting? What if counting was done by accountable individuals? What if there was always at least two different candidate scrutineers or members of the public per staff member. 

A14: This is actually the system now with the sole difference being that the Senate preference flow is provided by a scan of the voting paper. Thanks to One Nation legislation passed by the previous LNP Government, there is now an audit on that count and for some months now an audit has been underway into the AEC computer system to ensure integrity in the next election. 

The preference flow is also checked by a third-party group comprised of University Academics and they have not found errors that affected the result. Indeed, they show the preference flow is very accurate. 

Q15: The AEC “disinformation register” is an affront to the Australian public. A transparency system would be far more useful. When bureaucrats exceed their authority as public servants paid from the taxes of hard-working Australians, what mechanisms can we put in place to ensure these petty tyrants are removed from their positions? 

A15: The disinformation register is an area One Nation are investigating. The idea had some merit, but its implementation seems biased against minor parties.  

Q16: What has changed since these findings below? 

  •  “the electoral system is open to manipulation is beyond question  … Fraudulent enrolment is almost impossible to prevent.”  (NSW Electoral Commissioners, Messrs R. Cundy and Ian Dickson, in the NSW Government Inquiry 1989.  
  • “Electoral fraud, malpractice and errors are a common feature of the Australian electoral system,” Alex Howen, Metropolitan  Vice-Pres of the NSW Liberal Party 11/9/1999. 
  • 78% of several thousand people voted “Yes” on www.publicdebate.com.au in year 2001 to the question “Should a Royal Commission be held into Electoral Fraud?”  
  • The Shepherdson Inquiry in Queensland found that ALP members had done Vote Frauds in 1986, 1993 and 1996.  This was an evidential finding by a Judge 

A16: Historical cases are unlikely to inform current electoral process, although it does show that the ALP and LNP will cheat if an opportunity arises. One Nation is calling for further electoral reform.

Q17: Recent data showed that millions of dollars of corporate “donations” continue to fill the coffers of the major parties and that 40% of money received is not disclosed at all. I would like to see the following reforms legislated ASAP, including real-time disclosure of all donations over $2,500, banning big political donations altogether, and limiting electoral spending by parties and corporations. How will you ensure that these reforms are part of the recommendations made in the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters?  

A17: One Nation supports improving electoral disclosure laws and extending those to cover third party financing such as the Teals used in 2022. However, be aware that both the LNP and ALP vote together to maintain the status quo in this area. 

Q18: Should voters stop using a pencil when filling out a ballot paper? 

A18: There is no reason you can’t use your own black ball point pen (please ensure it writes clearly). Pencils are used simply because of cost and can be stored and used again without the ink running dry.

Q19: The AEC says that “Staff are obligated to report any suspicious activity to their supervisor.” – but this doesn’t mean a group of activist employees would do so. How can we ensure the AEC is free from infiltration by activists? 

A19: The AEC certainly harbours activists, however it is impossible to hire 100,000 people and not get activists. There is no system in the world that can stop that. The “people” factor is the wrong way to look at it. If the systems are properly secure, remote monitored and alarmed, ballots transported securely (not by AEC staff), and the voter rolls audited with rolling audits, then the few “bad eggs” that creep in will not be able to do any harm. 

Q20: It seems obvious that the main parties won’t fix the mess the AEC has become even though the commission itself says, “The AEC runs elections and referendums in accordance with legislation, and I note that many of the suggestions that you have made would require legislative change. I suggest raising them with your local member of parliament and/or senators.”  How do we get this legislation changed? 

A20: One Nation was successful in authoring election integrity legislation that was passed by the Morrison LNP Government. As a result, Australia now has election auditing mandated by legislation. That auditing is currently underway. 

Other reforms require support from the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) and One Nation is not a member. The review is underway into the 2022 Federal Election. Submissions have now closed. The next step is to see the recommendations and then prepare a further integrity bill to respond to the many issues raised.

Q21: Current AEC chief, Tom Rogers, is quoted saying “Citizens have the right to express views about democratic events that are a contest of ideas – the AEC does not restrict those freedoms.” Despite this, the AEC inappropriately took to social media in a ‘war’ against so-called ‘misinformation’ which amounted to suppression of free speech. How is this not illegal? 

A21: There was a lot of disinformation in the last election and I understand the AEC wanting to deal with that. Confidence in the result is essential for democracy. Having said that, the operation of the AEC around “disinformation” attracted a lot of criticism. One Nation is pursuing this matter to get a better balance into the process for the next election. 

Q22: Has the AEC got an opinion on the “Yes” campaign having a flood of taxpayer’s money to support it while the “No” campaign gets stuff-all? AEC states, “While we’ll be active in communicating about referendum processes, it’s up to voters to stop and consider information they see, hear or read from ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns.” Isn’t that the sort of “mistruth” Mr Tom Rogers should be “prebunking”? What do we hear from the AEC about the Yes-biased campaign? Crickets. 

A22: The AEC has so far followed it’s enabling legislation. It is the Albanese Government that is immorally trying to influence the referendum outcome by funding the ‘yes’ vote and not the ‘no’ vote. Please direct any feedback on this to the Albanese Government. 

Q23: Electoral reform needs to happen and it appears that while we run with the 2-party preferred system, we will never get another party into a majority position for change or reform. Minor parties will fight over the scraps. Reform will be difficult and part of the issue is the AEC. The question is who regulates the regulators? 

A23: The Australian people regulate the regulators by way of elections and referendums. If any Australian is unhappy with the outcome, please get involved – sign up as a candidate or poll worker and exercise your democratic rights before we lose them. 

Q24: The NSW Electoral Commission confirmed that no ballot boxes were to be removed from polling stations until after they were counted. Why were NSW Electoral Commission vested staff removing ballot boxes from booths? This is alleged to have occurred at 8 booths. AEC-vested staff are said to have walked around hospitals with iPads asking if people would like to vote. Country polling stations were being closed and electors asked to submit mail-in ballots.  

A24: One Nation has examined every video that was provided to us, or viewed on social media. Each of the videos show ballot boxes being removed from pre-poll centres correctly sealed and in the custody of AEC staff. We believe that no staff of the AEC should be moving ballots and instead, secure couriers with video surveillance on the load and GPS tracking should be used.

Can the seals be defeated? We are looking into this following multiple reports that this is possible, however we have not seen a video or statutory declaration indicating it is actually possible. 

Voting in nursing homes on iPads is acceptable if there are scrutineers in place. Based on our information, there were scrutineers and the count was accepted by those scrutineers. 

Closed voting centres are probably due to staffing issues, but if you have information regarding specific centres, please let us know via contact us.

Q25: At the 2023 NSW election, ballots were being mishandled. As confirmed by the NSWEC, they are only responsible for what occurs to the ballots up to and including 6 metres from the polling booth.  

A25: The AEC does not run NSW elections. As this is a state matter, you will need to contact the NSW Electoral Commission: https://elections.nsw.gov.au/contact-us

Q26: Why were there blank boxes above the line in the Senate ballot? 

A26: The wording of this section of the Electoral Act is poor and can be read to allow a blank name, which is what the AEC have done.

This decision disadvantages grouped independents as people are reticent to vote for a blank box.

The videos and audio recordings of AEC staff advising voters to not vote or worse, that they cannot vote in that square, are real and call into question training of the AEC staff. 

One Nation supports amending that provision of the Electoral Act to require grouped independents to be labelled as “grouped independent” and not be left blank. 

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The AEC are their own worst enemy!

,

I receive a lot of constituent inquiries regarding election issues. My staff look into these and we created a file of potential electoral irregularities. I have been working through these potential issues with the AEC for three years, and still there are questions on the list. The AEC are doing a great job of running elections and a crap job of explaining irregularities when they occur.

Elections can always be more secure and more efficiently run. The AEC would be well advised to work with critics to solve these issues off these issues or explain them openly and honestly. I was pleased that Commissioner Rogers met with my staff and reviewed these issues a few weeks ago. I thank the Commissioner and his team for his time. As a result many old issues were explained to our satisfaction. Today I asked about those that were not adequately explained.

The answers today on the quality of the electoral roll for instance confirms our suspicions that there are 1.5m incorrect entries on the roll, based just on a data matching exercise against known databases – usually drivers licenses. It is One Nation’s position that only a physical audit can really get to the bottom of how many orphan or incorrect entries are padding out our electoral rolls. This is an urgent issue. A request for the last known proper audit that was promised at our meeting was sidestepped, so this is something I will pursue.

Answers also dealt with the question of why some people get postal vote applications they did not request in the name of previous residents of their premises. Postal vote applications are often made after a letterbox drop by a major party or activist organisation. Those postal vote applications are returned to the political party, who have, according to testimony, created their own voter database of these likely supporters. Are these groups submitting postal vote applications on behalf of voters without their knowledge, including voters who have moved on? This is a really dodgy way to do postal voting. Applications must go directly to the AEC to prevent this sort of voter interference.

Mr Rogers did provide assurance on other issues around ballot box security, and we look forward to getting an actual ballot box seal to test for ourselves. One Nation believes the best system for moving ballot boxes from temporary voting locations to the regional counting centre is a point to point professional courier with GPS locating so there can be no doubt the ballot box was secure in transit.

Regional counting centres should also be equipped with alarms and security cameras.

Finally I asked about the new audits that the AEC were required to have conducted as a result of legislation passed in the last Parliament as a result of One Nation’s actions. There seems to be some confusion on which audit we were talking about, so I will follow that up with a more detailed request.

These issues should in no way discourage Australians from voting or be taken to mean our elections are rigged in any way. Every Australian can have confidence Australia has amongst the world’s most accurate elections, however there is always room for improvement. We live in an internet age where one report can be amplified thousands of time to create an impression of impropriety that is not fair on the 100,000 Australians who help run our elections. More effort by the AEC to address these “internet rumours” is needed.

Click Here for Transcripts

PART 1

Senator Roberts: Thank you for being here again today. Firstly, Minister Farrell, thank you for  arranging the briefing by Mr Rogers and his team.

Senator Farrell: You’re always welcome, Senator, and if you have any other questions I’m sure the commissioner or his team would be very happy to help. And that invitation I extend to all senators.

Senator Roberts: We appreciate the briefing. We were very pleased with the briefing—the way it was conducted; the thoroughness of it. My apologies for not being there, but I got caught up in the Senate, I think, at the time. Anyway, the briefing was most helpful and cleared up a lot of questions that we had—a lot from constituents, of course. It’s very important for the AEC to have the confidence of the people of Australia in election results. I’ve got some follow-up questions, because constituents deserve an answer. It impacts on election credibility. In the meeting with my staff, you mentioned that the electoral rolls had been audited twice in the last 10 years, and I’d understood that the details of those audits would be sent through. We haven’t received them yet. Can you provide more details, please, of those audits?

Mr Rogers: I might just get Ms Gleeson to step up momentarily. I’ll follow up and find out what we said at that meeting and what we promised to provide, and we’ll provide whatever information we have on that.  But while I’ve got the floor, for the reasons that you said, it’s important, I think for Australians to have faith in the electoral system. It is great news, I think, that first of all the electoral roll is at 97.2 per cent completeness. It really is in many cases the envy of the democratic world, which is great. As to the processes that we have in place to ensure high integrity, Australians can be very satisfied with that. I think, in fact—I’m looking at Ms Gleeson—we put online every year the results of that.

Ms Gleeson: The Annual Roll Integrity Review is conducted yearly, and those results are available on the website.

Mr Rogers: And not only that. Every transaction we undertake with the roll—and there are millions on an annual basis—is an integrity transaction in any case. It’s interesting—it’s important, I should say—to reflect on what ‘integrity’ means with the roll, because there are two components for integrity which are very critical for us to think about. One is to make sure that only the individuals who should be on the roll are on the roll, and that’s a really critically important part. But the second part of integrity, internationally accepted, is to make sure that everyone who should be on the roll is included on the roll as well. So with those two metrics in mind—those two guardrails—over the last decade the AEC has gone to great extents to grow the roll and also to look at those aspects of the roll where individual groups have been underrepresented. As we said before, youth and Indigenous Australians have been traditionally underrepresented. We’ve been doing a lot of work in that regard, and we’re very satisfied with what we’ve done with that.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. Ms Gleeson, I want to understand the details of the audits on the rolls. I think the last ANAO audit of the Australian Electoral Commission was in 2013, with a report that came out two years later, in 2015. So could you please send the details that were promised at that meeting?

Mr Rogers: Yes, sure.

Ms Gleeson: Of course.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. We don’t know what it audited, what the specific findings were and what rolls were involved, and it was 10 years ago. This is a follow-up question regarding the new audit provided in section 273AA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act, requiring a substantive audit of the Australian Electoral Commission computer systems by an auditor accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate.. Can you confirm that that audit is underway, and do you have an expected return date, please?

Ms Gleeson: Senator, can you repeat the section of the act you’re referring to, please.

Senator Roberts: Section 2733AA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

Ms Gleeson: Section 273AA is an assurance of the security of computer systems for Senate scrutiny, or the IRAP assessment. This is an assessment conducted by a person or body accredited by ASD—that is, an IRAP assessor. It provides a draft report from the assessor with recommendations and identified risks. The AEC actions recommendations and implements appropriate mitigations to manage those risks, and a public statement is published on the AEC website stating a security risk assessment has been completed as required. For the 2022 federal election, accredited assessors completed security risk assessments of applicable systems prior to the federal election. Recommendations made were accepted by the AEC, and prior to the election appropriate mitigations were implemented to manage those risks, and a statement of assurance relating to those assessments was published on 19 May on the AEC website. I’m happy to provide the link to that statement.

Senator Roberts: Yes, please, if you could take that on notice. I’d like that link. I understand there are three audits. One is a software audit that audits the software used to allocate Senate preferences, which you passed. Another is an audit of the accuracy of scanning Senate ballot papers, which was passed as well. Mr Rogers, while you and your staff were most generous in giving your time, there was one issue the meeting did not get to, and that’s postal voting. My office received many reports of people receiving postal votes in the name of past residents in their premises—sometimes multiple ballots. I’m trying to understand the system to see if an improvement can be made or if indeed this is still best practice. This line of questioning is based on the number of reports of multiple ballots arriving at the same address in the name of residents who have not been there for years but who are still on the rolls. This suggests that a third party—maybe a political party or activists like GetUp—could be recording applications from the previous election and re-using that data to put in fake applications. Is it true that any voter can request a postal ballot by filling out the application and posting it to the Australian Electoral Commission, who ensure the person is on the rolls and, if so, send out a ballot?

Mr Rogers: I might start on that. Postal voting is a legislative part of the Australian electoral process. Not only that, it provides access to the vote for a large number of Australians who would otherwise—

Senator Roberts: We accept that.

Mr Rogers: be unable to achieve it. There is a process in place. Citizens are able to jump onto our website and make an application for a postal vote, or the way it has worked in elections is that political parties also send out applications. Regardless of where the application comes from, we do a thorough check of the information coming back, so no vote is included in the count—let me be more accurate: no elector’s vote is included in the count unless we’ve first assessed that they have an entitlement for that process. So it’s not so much about the information that goes out; it’s what comes back that’s the most critical part of that process. Perhaps Ms Gleeson might like to add to that.

Ms Gleeson: The process that Mr Rogers is referring to is preliminary scrutiny, which is a process outlined under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. That means that, when we receive back a completed postal vote, it goes through a process of checking that the information provided on the declaration certificate on the front of the postal vote is correctly completed in compliance with the Electoral Act. Then there is a check against the electoral roll to confirm that the elector is in fact enrolled and entitled for their vote to be counted. At that point, the vote is either accepted and progresses to further scrutiny or rejected and not opened.

Senator Roberts: Is it marked off once it’s accepted?

Ms Gleeson: Correct. If it is accepted it is marked off as that individual having voted.

Senator Roberts: The voter gets the application form by going to the website. Are there other ways?

Ms Gleeson: There are a range of ways that voters can access a postal vote application. Applications can be lodged online through our online postal voting application system, and the majority of voters do use that system.  There is also the option to use a paper form, which is available from our website or from AEC offices, and you’d be aware that there are also party postal vote applications, which the AEC does not issue but parties are entitled to issue under the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

Senator Roberts: So you don’t send out how-to-vote cards—sorry, postal vote application forms as a matter of course? You don’t letterbox drop; you don’t post them in the mail?

Ms Gleeson: No.

Senator Roberts: They can get them through political parties. So a political party can letterbox  postal vote applications, and, if completed by a voter, that application goes first to the political party and then to the AEC—is that correct?

Mr Rogers: That’s correct. Just to be very clear, though, because I know sometimes people get confused about that, political parties do not receive citizens’ votes. All they receive is the application form, which is then sent to us. The postal vote certificate, which includes the votes, is sent from AEC and never goes to the political parties.  It’s an important point to note because I know we get some complaints about that. And, only because you just mentioned it, Senator, I will deal at the same time with sending out how-to-vote cards. The AEC does not send out how-to-vote cards.

Senator Roberts: That was a slip of my tongue.

Mr Rogers: But sometimes we get that, and I might just opine on it, because I suspect what occasionally happens is that someone will receive possibly even a postal vote certificate from the AEC with their duly authorised postal vote, and, when they pick up the material from the letterbox and put it on their table, quite often there will be other material that’s distributed at election time. They’ll open the material and go, ‘Oh, my God, the AEC has distributed how-to-vote cards,’ because it’s on the list of materials. We do not ever distribute how-to-vote cards. It’s an important point.

Senator Roberts: There is a lot of distrust in the electorate right now because of what’s happened in the last three years. There’s been a lot of lost confidence in governments. So a political party can letterbox postal vote applications. What about the case of a renter, say, who’s just moved into his or her rental place and they’ve got five applications through the mail?

Mr Rogers: They might have received—

Senator Roberts: In different names.

Mr Rogers: I’m not aware of that, but they might have received five applications from different political parties or entities—but, again, what goes out is one thing. The important thing for us is what comes back and what we then mark off and that we then ensure that that voter has an entitlement to vote. It’s a legislative entitlement for political parties and entities to distribute postal vote applications. It’s actually enshrined in the Electoral Act. We have our own integrity measure for that coming back, and we’re confident that we’ve got processes in place that are robust.

Senator Roberts: Are there any rules around harvesting of the data by the political party?

Mr Rogers: What political parties do with the data they have is a matter for them. I know that all the political parties have databases that they use that are not controlled or contributed to by the AEC.

Senator Roberts: So can they go directly to the AEC if the applicant wants, or do they have to go through the party?

Mr Rogers: Not only that, Senator. I’m just expressing a personal preference here—I’m not annoying anyone—but if it were up to me I’d encourage citizens to come to the AEC website to apply for their postal vote application.

Senator Roberts: Chair, I am going to quickly read through some questions I’m going to submit on notice.  First, how many postal vote applications were received before the 2022 election? Second, of those, how many were duplicates—the same person applying more than once? Third, how many applications were refused after being checked on the electoral roll? Fourth, how many postal vote applications were approved and sent out? If not the same figure, please explain. Fifth, how many postal ballots were returned to the Australian Electoral Commission with a comment such as ‘not at this address’ or ‘didn’t request’, and, as a result, were any challenges issued to enrolled voters? Sixth, how many completed postal ballots were received back, whether in time to be counted or not? Seventh, how many people voted on polling day and then a postal vote was also received in their name? We’re just making sure that citizens can have confidence in the election.

Mr Rogers: We’ll provide that information. But just let me answer that last bit: citizens can have confidence in the election.

Senator Roberts: We’re getting a lot of questions that suggest they don’t. That may be due to the last three years; I don’t know.

Mr Rogers: Senator, we have one of the most transparent, robust electoral processes globally. On that, in terms of its transparency—because you raised the point that citizens need to have confidence, which we back up—we’ve given something like 12 hours of evidence at over 10 hearings since the election. We’ve submitted an untold number of submissions—43,000 words. At the election itself we made ourselves available for 400 media interviews, me included. We answered 4,000 media inquiries. Critically, one of those transparency measures was the 105,000 workers that we had who were members of the community, who were involved in every step of the process. Tens of thousands of party scrutineers were involved in that process. There was the fact that all the results were put online.  I know you know this, because you and I have spoken about this previously, but it’s always useful to remind citizens that there are so many transparency and integrity measures that underpin a really robust framework. Australian citizens should be rightly proud that we’ve got one of the most accessible electoral systems in the world, one of the most high-integrity systems and one of the most transparent. We’re very proud of that. A lot of that is due to the work of committees like this, with the legislation that buttresses the electoral system, but a lot of it also is the work of bureaucrats and members of the AEC over many, many electoral cycles, who have produced such outstanding results.  I know that you, as a member of parliament, won’t mind me saying that, because you’re aware of just how important it is that citizens do have confidence in the processes that exist. I know from time to time you ask these sorts of questions, but it’s important for me to respond that way so people understand that what we do is produce one of the world’s best electoral systems. Citizens should have great confidence in the outcomes of that process.

Senator Roberts: Thanks to your answers in past Senate estimates and our own research, on many of the questions that have been submitted to us—and we’ve had a number of topics covered—we can reassure people, which is important. There are some where we have not been able to reassure. The last election raised several issues that, bit by bit, have been resolved. The fact that we still get complaints, despite all the work you’ve done to publicise, shows how deeply entrenched that feeling is in the community.

Mr Rogers: Senator, it’s interesting—and I’m sorry for taking up your time here, but it’s worthwhile talking about that—that some of those many, many complaints, like things that we get, are not in any way tethered to the reality of the legislation or election delivery. We’re still getting stuff where people are telling us that we’re using Dominion voting machines. I’m sorry, I—

Senator Roberts: That’s an easy one.

Mr Rogers: But do you know what I mean?

Senator Roberts: I understand.

Mr Rogers: You’re talking about many complaints. If we get 10,000 people telling us we’re using Dominion voting machines, it’s irrelevant.

Senator Roberts: Yes.

Mr Rogers: That’s why it’s important for me to make those statements I made that we really do have one of the world’s best electoral systems and I’m very proud of the work that all of our staff have done. I know you’ll know this, but, every day in Australia, AEC staff do great work. We’re running close to, I think, 1,000 industrial elections of one sort or another a year. We’ve got 100,000 schoolkids most years pumping through the Electoral Education Centre here in Canberra. We’re looking after the roll. We’re working with our state colleagues. Every day, AEC staff are making a contribution to electoral integrity in Australia. It’s so important. I’m so proud of the team that support that outcome, and it’s important for the community to know that as well.

Chair: You do have to identify issues that affect the integrity of an election and respond accordingly, don’t you?

Mr Rogers: Absolutely, which is what we do on a very regular basis. Let me do another shout-out—it’s not just us; we’re supported by a range of other agencies who also assist with that matter of electoral integrity. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to say that, Senator. It’s just important for the community to understand that.

Chair: Can you think of an example, in 2013, when such an event happened?

Mr Rogers: Events like that are like a crucible, and they enable us to come out even better from the process, which is what we’ve done. It was an unfortunate circumstance in 2013. We went through a whole period afterwards analysing what we’ve done. Where we are today is significantly more advanced from that process as a result of—

Chair: As someone who lost their seat in that era, event or whatever you would call it, I express my confidence in the current processes. Thank you for your evidence today.

PART 2

Senator Roberts: The remaining questions go mostly to how ballots are moved. The movement of ballot papers continues to be something that constituents ask my office about a lot. The Australian Electoral Commission moves ballots from prepolls to regional counting centres as required to facilitate counting. Is that correct?

Mr Rogers: That’s correct.

Senator Roberts: The movement is done by AEC staff in private cars—their own cars, presumably. The ballot boxes are sealed and there is a movement log to control the process. Is that correct?

Mr Rogers: That’s correct. And each of the ballot boxes is sealed in the polling place in the presence of scrutineers. The seal numbers are recorded. So, that’s a tracked process.

Senator Roberts: Having scrutineered, I can verify that—for the actual location, not the movement. Can I have a sample of a movement log, please, with personal identifying information redacted?

Mr Rogers: No, Senator. The time for the asking of those questions was in the 40-day period after the conclusion of the election, where those records are retained and opened for people to examine. But in terms of movement logs, they are certifications that are, to provide a chain of custody, signed by the officers at each point of the process. It is inherently personal, with their names, signatures, and other issues, so I won’t provide that.

Senator Roberts: Okay. I accept that. Does the log have the time that the staff member left the prepoll location and the time the ballots were signed into the regional counting centre?

Mr Rogers: I’m not sure—possibly.

Senator Roberts: There is a possibility that they could be left in the car overnight in the driveway, for example?

Mr Rogers: No. The material is returned.

Senator Roberts: Yes, but what’s the time elapsed from when it’s removed, picked up, and when it’s deposited?

Mr Rogers: They leave the polling place and then go back to the outposted centre for the material to be collated and checked in.

Senator Roberts: Directly?

Mr Rogers: Directly.

Senator Roberts: Do you require staff who are transporting ballots to travel from point to point, so they’re required to go straight from the prepoll to the regional polling centre?

Mr Rogers: That’s generally the assumption.

Senator Roberts: It’s an assumption. Do you require that?

Ms Gleeson: As you can imagine, there are hundreds of thousands of logistics routes that ballot papers travel during the course of an event, and each movement of ballot papers is planned and is signed off by the appropriate supervisor at the AEC.

Senator Roberts: The actual route used?

Ms Gleeson: Yes. We do route planning, and there are exception processes if there’s—

Senator Roberts: A flood?

Ms Gleeson: a long route to be travelled and a documented reason as to why a long route needs to be travelled. Our documentation supports that and is appropriately signed off, but there are a number of permutations that the movement may take, depending on the complex logistics that the ballot papers have to travel.

Senator Roberts: Could concerns about the integrity of these ballots running around in private cars be alleviated by using secure point-to-point couriers equipped with GPS, as couriers are these days?

Mr Pope: I don’t think there’d be enough trucks in Australia—I’m serious.

Mr Rogers: We’re talking about 8,000 polling places. We’ve already got 105,000 staff. Quite often these movements occur late in the evening. Effectively, that’s a process that’s used not only at federal elections but also at state elections and has been used for 120 years without any mishaps. So, I’m very confident in the processes we’ve got in place.

Senator Roberts: So, it’s not a matter of cost, because the minister’s just allocated $364 million for a referendum. It’s about logistics.

Mr Rogers: It would be a huge matter of cost, let alone of whether there is actually that number of trucks available at that time in Australia in those locations to do it.

Senator Roberts: That’s what Mr—Price, is it?—said.

Mr Rogers: Pope.

Mr Pope: Pope.

Senator Roberts: Pope—sorry. Have you personally examined the seal the AEC uses to seal the ballot box? Have you tried to open it without detection and generally assured yourself that it’s fit for purpose?

Mr Rogers: As it happens, I have.

Senator Roberts: Good.

Mr Rogers: I’m very happy with those seals, and I’m very happy with the process that we have in place.

Senator Roberts: Can I have one to examine?

Mr Rogers: Sure.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. Maybe that’s a perfect video topic for you to quell any lack of confidence.  For clarity, please: videos showing the movement of ballot boxes posted online appear to show four seals on a ballot box. Is that correct?

Mr Rogers: I haven’t seen the video that you’re talking about, Senator.

Ms Gleeson: We have a range of types of ballot box, Senator. It depends on which one you’re referring to.

Senator Roberts: Okay. Each of the seals has a unique number?

Ms Gleeson: Correct.

Senator Roberts: All seals are accounted for at the end of the count?

Mr Rogers: They’re accounted for in the process of movement. They’re recorded at the point of departure.  They’re recorded at the point of arrival. So, in that sense, they’re accounted for.

Senator Roberts: Were any missing in the 2022 federal election, and were any duplicate seals, fake seals or boxes with broken seals detected?

Mr Rogers: No, absolutely not.

Senator Roberts: Do you do a reconciliation on ballot papers printed and ballot papers accounted for at the end of the process?

Mr Rogers: Yes, we do.

Senator Roberts: What was the figure in May ’22 for unders or overs? Zero would be impossible, of course; we understand the logistics effort. There had to be some variance. What is that variance?

Ms Gleeson: Could you clarify what you mean by ‘unders’ and ‘overs’, please, Senator.

Senator Roberts: Well, comparing ballot papers printed and ballot papers accounted for, sometimes one would be higher than the other. So what is that variance?

Ms Gleeson: We don’t have that to hand.

Senator Roberts: No, you wouldn’t have it here.

Mr Rogers: Let me take that on notice, Senator.

Senator Roberts: That’s fine. Thank you. Are watermarks on a ballot paper a feasible security option?

Ms Gleeson: Our ballot papers are watermarked, Senator.

Senator Roberts: Okay. That shows you I don’t pay much attention! Close enough!

Ms Gleeson: It’s deliberately difficult to detect, perhaps, but very obvious to electoral administrators.

Senator Roberts: This is just a matter of curiosity: are you examining online voting? I know some university academics have a system for secure online voting using blockchain technology. Minister or Mr Rogers?

Mr Rogers: Well, Senator, it’s a very interesting question, but, if you wanted a very short answer, the answer would be no. For us, paper based voting has a number of security aspects that are almost impossible to replicate online. But I guess there is a point at which, at some point in the future, supply of paper and printing is going to be an issue for Australia in the sort of quantities that we’re talking about. We’re not there yet, but, at a point, that will need to be looked at. But, just to be very clear, we’re not examining any online or electronic voting system for use in any federal election, referendum or by-election.

Senator Roberts: I’m with you. I like the paper system. It’s very hard to corrupt, because there are always people around. Will you be using scanning to count the referendum, or a manual count?

Mr Rogers: A manual count.

Senator Roberts: That’s why the cost is so high—$364 million.

Mr Rogers: Handcrafted.

Senator Roberts: Sorry?

Mr Rogers: Handcrafted.

Senator Roberts: Ha, ha! And how will scrutineers be picked? It’s not a matter of parties having scrutineers they can put them forward but some people loosely on a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ campaign. How will you select scrutineers?

Mr Rogers: The legislation is slightly different for the appointment of scrutineers at a referendum. It can be through the registered officers of political parties, but the state governors and the Governor-General can also appoint scrutineers. That’s pretty much the process, I think.

Mr Pope: The state governors and the Governor-General can appoint an authorised person who can appoint those scrutineers on their behalf.  But, just to be precise around your question, it’s got nothing to do with us. It’s not our appointment.

Senator Roberts: I know. That’s what I’m getting at: who does it? I didn’t think you’d be appointing them.

Mr Pope: Oh, I thought you said, ‘How are you appointing scrutineers?’

Senator Roberts: I’m sorry. I meant: how will you allow scrutineers in?

Mr Rogers: Again, the registered officers of registered political parties, state governors and the Governor-General.

Senator Roberts: Thank you.

/12 Comments/by

Election Integrity: Make sure our elections cannot be rigged

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The Australian National Audit Office is one of the best agencies in government. They do great work chasing down wasteful government spending and exposing poor management.

The few times they have looked at the conduct of our elections, like in 2015, the report card was a solid fail. They haven’t audited the conduct of our elections since then despite promising to.

Last night at Senate Estimates the Auditor General was very honest and upfront with me. He cannot confirm the Australian Electoral Commission has comprehensive performance standards for elections. He cannot assure the Australian people that the electoral systems are fit for purpose.

He did say that the way for the community to be assured about the integrity of elections is through the Parliament acting. One Nation’s Election Integrity Bill (read more) was written for this very good reason. Whatever happens in the next election, if it passes, the public can have confidence in the result.

Parliament must pass an election integrity bill before the next election.

Transcript

Senator Rice, Senator Roberts, very quickly.

Thank you chair, and thank you all for attending. Hello Mr. Heir. I’ll just give some background, and then the questions will be quick.

Very quickly, Senator Roberts.

If I can reference the report titled third follow-up audit into the Australian electoral commission’s preparation for the conduct of federal elections. It’s ANAO audit number 6 2015-16. This inquiry was called by the joint standing committee on election electoral matters. The terms of reference were a performance audit focusing on the adequacy of the Australian electoral commission’s implementation of recommendations arising from earlier, and they are audit reports. Your findings were and I’ll quote, no meaningful action has been taken had been taken prior to 2013. The election that triggered the audit in relation to those recommendations directed towards more secure reporting of election night counts on the development of comprehensive or the development of comprehensive performance standards for the conduct of elections. And finally, conclusion number eight, ANAO plans to undertake a follow-up audit following the next federal election to examine adequacy and effectiveness of the AECs implementation of these 10 recommendations in that report. Did you do that followup audit?

We did. We didn’t do a followup, followup audit Senator of exactly that nature. We did a further audit, which was, which was focused on particular aspects of procurement, including IT, for the scanning system system following the next election. But now we didn’t follow up each of those recommendations as was then proposed.

Thank you. Can you confirm that the AEC now has comprehensive performance standards for the conduct of federal elections?

No, Senator we haven’t been in there to conduct a performance audit in this space since that, that one I mentioned. So, no, we don’t, we don’t, we don’t have current knowledges as to that know.

I like your quick answers. How, how would anyone know if that would, if they’d done that?

I suspect you’d ask them in estimates.

We’ve asked them lots of times and their questions are their answers. Why didn’t you do the follow-up audit? That would have been the fourth followup audit on the AEC.

I think we, what we decided to do was in the context of what was going on in the, in the office at the time, which was the IT procurement, that that was probably a, a better order to undertake in the AEC. It’s not a huge agency. It’s not the one. We go into every year. So, so about picking the topic. And at that particular time we thought that was that that procurement audit was a, a better topic to undertake.

Can you say with confidence that the AEC systems now are fit for purpose?

We haven’t been into the entity.

How can people be assured of the integrity of future elections?

I think through the parliamentary processes is the appropriate way for the community to be assured through the oversight. The parliament gives of the, the office.

I could make a comment. Do you not against you? Do you have the authority to audit?

Yes, I say yes.

Okay. My last question chair, in your submission to the finance and public administration’s inquiry into my Commonwealth electoral amendment integrity of elections, bill 2021. ANAO made this statement, I quote in accordance with the auditor General’s mandate under the auditor general act, 1997, the auditor general is empowered to conduct a review of a particular aspect of the operations of the AEC at any time. ANAO could have conducted a followup audit in respect to the AEC’s noncompliance with multiple ANAO audits. Yet you chose not to why I?

Think of.

If there were multiple audits.

We were doing.

My multiple follow-up audit. Sorry.

We did multiple followup audits then the last audit we did, I made a decision that the.

Not follow up at the specific electronics.

Yeah. That was the reason.

Will you audit the next election.

I.

Was seen it also understanding it through. The first three follow-up audits followed what happened in the 2013 election with Senate Ballot Papers in Western Australia being effectively lost. And whilst there are three audits that audit was conducted the then audit general received a specific request from the joint standing committee of electoral matters for us to do follow-up audit work, looking at an earlier audit we did have the 2007 election as to where those recommendations have been implemented. The only reason there were three followup audit wasn’t was because the joint standing committee of electoral matters, wanted us to one of particular things looked at very quickly. And so that’s why there were three performance audit. So we packaged up what are the recommendations we could follow up as a higher priority in a shorter timeframe and then a medium timeframe and then longer timeframe. So it was, it was by seen. By three audit was really packaging out the follow-up to that all the way earlier audit report, to meet a request of the parliament, So, you know.

So as Mr. Hare said, it’s, it’s a matter of looking at the, what the followup is in context of what’s going on. Okay. Thanks, Chair.

/1 Comment/by

Ensuring Election Integrity – Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Integrity of Elections) Bill 2021

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When I started researching election integrity I was doing it to show that our elections are secure. That is not what I found. There is no requirement to audit the results and no ID requirements to ensure there is no double voting. Our electoral legislation is full of holes. My bill seeks to fix those holes using audits that many well researched committees, agencies and investigations have already suggested. There really isn’t much reason to vote against it.

Transcript

As a servant to the people of Queensland and Australia I present the the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Integrity of Elections) Bill 2021, which amends the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.

This bill provides for the routine auditing of the electronic component of Australian federal elections and for the provision of voter identification.

It should also be noted that this bill does not look backward to previous elections, but rather forward to ensure confidence in the next election.

During COVID the actions of unelected bureaucrats and incompetent politicians has wiped out small businesses and jobs, disrupted lives and reduced many people to desperation.

The next election will be a powder keg.

It is essential to ensure that Australians can accept the result and move on.

Suspicion of the outcome can be easily fueled, especially on social media, and turned into violence by those who seek to manipulate the result for their own ends.

The level of trust in the result must be commensurate with the current heightened level of risk.

When I started researching election integrity it was to show that our elections are secure. That is not what I found.

The Australian National Audit Office conducted three audits into the 2013 federal election. Their final report came out in 2016. This is what ANAO said about the Australian Electoral Commission (the AEC):

In 2014 the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters wrote to the Auditor General seeking a performance audit focusing on the adequacy of the Australian Electoral Commission implementation of recommendations arising from earlier ANAO audits of the AEC.

The Auditor General decided to conduct 3 related performance audits.

All three reports found that the AEC had not adequately and effectively implemented the earlier ANAO recommendations. The reports concluded that in order to protect the integrity of the Australian electoral system and rebuild confidence in the AEC these recommendations should be implemented.

AUDITOR-GENERAL REPORT NO. 6 OF 2015–16

The report went on to say:

“ANAO plans to undertake a follow-up audit following the next federal election, in 2016, to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of the AEC’s implementation of the ten recommendations made by ANAO across three reports.”

AUDITOR-GENERAL REPORT NO. 6 OF 2015–16

Those recommendations included:

“the AEC must develop a strategy for deeper reform to ensure and demonstrate integrity in all aspects of the election, including a fundamental overhaul of the AEC’s policies and procedures to restore confidence in the electoral process”.

AUDITOR-GENERAL REPORT NO. 6 OF 2015–16

Let me say that again – a fundamental overhaul to ensure election integrity.

Mr President the follow-up audit to test how well the AEC implemented this fundamental review into election integrity never occurred.

Perhaps someone should do a bill to bring on that audit. Oh wait Mr President, I did.

Were ANAO happy for this direction – apparently not.

In their submission to this bill ANAO said my bill was not necessary as they had the power to audit the AEC at any time.

If that is the case then they should get on with it.

Mr President New South Wales and Western Australia have provisions in their electoral acts to audit state elections.

New South Wales conducts an audit before each election to ensure systems are fit for purpose and then audits again after each election to ensure integrity, and to see what can be improved for next time.

Western Australia audits after every election.

There is no audit function currently specified in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.

This bill creates a function for the Auditor General to audit the operation of the AEC twice in each election cycle:

  1. In the lead up to the election; and
  2. From polling day to the declaration of the poll.

 The audit provided for in this bill covers electronic measures, and tests if:

“the use of authorised technology produces the same result as would be obtained without the use of authorised technology.”

Put simply this is asking the Auditor General to ensure that the use of computerised voter rolls, tallying, preference allocations and related matters produced a result that accurately reflects the will of the people.

ANAO felt that was too high a bar to meet, I would consider ensuring the will of the people was accurately reflected in the result was the bare minimum for any election audit.

This bill does not specify what will be audited. The decision regarding the operation of the audit is best left to the agencies conducting the audit.

Secondly, this bill authorises the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) to audit and monitor computer systems for unauthorised access internally and externally.

This is targeting both unauthorised access from within the system and unauthorised external access by malicious entities.

The Australia Signals Directorate is currently conducting a cyber “uplift program” at the Australian Electoral Commission. While the program is most welcome, there is no basis in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 or the Intelligence Services Act 2001 for that program.

This bill brings legislation into line with current practice.

Mr President In May Senate estimates I asked the Australian Electoral Commission simple questions regarding their auditing. I was assured that audits are occurring. On no occasion then or since have the following questions been answered:

  • Who conducted the audit?
  • When was the audit conducted?
  • What was audited?
  • What was the result?
  • Have any changes been made as a result of the audit?

It is disturbing that such an audit could happen behind closed doors without direction or structure. It is more disturbing that this program has no legal basis in the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

We should not have to rely on the admirable conscientiousness of the Australian Signals Directorate. We should be able to rely on the completeness of our legislation.

Mr President I also looked at other issues around election integrity.

First up was a simple question: At the Senate Scanning Centre is the electronic data file containing each vote ever compared back to the paper ballot after the vote has been adjudicated?

That answer is no. At no time is the electronic record of a vote checked back against the paper ballot once the ballot is adjudicated.

Some disputed votes are held back and adjudicated later in the counting process, then filed away.

There is no routine sampling beyond that point. That is not acceptable.

The third part of my bill is for voter ID. Most of the recommendations in the ANAO report, that was never followed up, went to failures in the integrity of voter rolls.

It is too late to go back now and audit those rolls before the next election, by way of re-commencing residency checks, as ANAO recommended.

It is not too late for a quick fix – which is voter ID. Asking for simple identification will act as an audit on the rolls in real time, and ensure every vote cast was legitimate.

This is not my idea. Recommendation 21 of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry into the 2019 Federal Election called for voter identification to be introduced. This same finding was made in 2016 and 2013.

Schedule 2 of this bill is drafted to give effect to the committee recommendation as literally as possible.

Voters must present a form of acceptable identification to be issued with an ordinary pre-poll or election day vote. Authorised identification must be suitably broad so as to not actively prevent electors from casting an ordinary ballot.

This bill allows a wide range of acceptable voter ID. The AEC is empowered to make further regulations to ensure voters are not disenfranchised.

The AEC noted in their submission to the JSCEM inquiry that:

“multiple voting is frequently the subject of media commentary and social media speculation. Such a degree of focus is entirely understandable: there can hardly be a more emblematic component of trust in electoral results than ensuring eligible voters only exercise the franchise [appropriately].”

Multiple voting is a red herring in this debate. My bill is not concerned with multiple voting, it is concerned with ensuring every vote cast was made according to law.

The Commonwealth Electoral Act (Integrity of Elections Bill) 2021 is about protecting confidence in our elections.

The cyber integrity of our elections and the use of voter identification is essential to that confidence.

I recommend the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Integrity of Elections) Bill 2021 to the Senate.

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Election Integrity – What has the government got to hide?

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Suspicion about the results of our elections is an existential threat to our country. Confidence comes from having strict auditing and checking procedures. We’ve seen that these auditing, checks and system are not fit for purpose. One Nation is asking for those deficiencies to be rectified.

Senate Estimates Questioning:

Transcript

As a servant to the people of Queensland and Australia, here we go again. Yet again the Labor Party are about to sit comfortably in the laps of the Liberals and Nationals to vote through measures that are in both of their own interests. Just yesterday I spoke of this parliament being dysfunctional to the point of being a crime scene. The very next day here we are watching the proof unfold again before our very eyes.

For those watching at home and wondering why One Nation did not use these electoral bills to introduce actual electoral reform, the answer is simple: the way these bills were written. There is one bill per topic and they include a long description that prevents One Nation from introducing amendments that move outside of that very narrow, restrictive scope.

If the government and Labor wanted to join three bills together and vote in one line, they should have produced the three bills as an omnibus bill that One Nation and the crossbench could have amended—and the legislation badly needs amendment. Senators Wong and Birmingham are once again making a mockery of the democratic process—dodgy siblings doing another dirty deal behind closed doors. When are we going to start writing numbers on the perspex screens so we can distinguish between the Liberal-Nationals and Labor! The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters made 27 recommendations towards more fair and effective elections. The ‘Lib-Lab duopoly’ has again rushed legislation before the Senate to implement a grand total of three of those recommendations, none of which does anything to ensure the integrity of our electoral process.

The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Offences and Preventing Multiple Voting) Bill 2021 pretends to do something about multiple voting. In the last three elections, the Australian Electoral Commission reviewed thousands of case of multiple voting and referred a few hundred of those to the Australian Federal Police for prosecution, who made the decision to prosecute none of them. Not one person has been prosecuted as a result of the ordinary operations of the Electoral Act despite recommendations to do so and despite that law being on the books for a very long time. That may be why the government has chosen to abandon the legal system and refer multiple voting to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Yesterday we saw cybercrime warrants being moved from the criminal court system to the administrative court system; today we have multiple voting moving over as well. One Nation is uncomfortable with the growing power of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and with the whole concept of having two court systems. Criminal courts are founded in biblical and common law; administrative courts have no such higher purpose to be called on for guidance.

The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Party Registration Integrity) Bill 2021 is clearly an attempt by Lib-Lab to knock out smaller parties and entrench the power of the status quo. I hear the anger on social media over this measure, yet I have some questions in return. Should a multimillionaire be allowed to use his wealth to buy political influence through the United Australia Party? The requirement to have 500 supporters is not going to slow down a very wealthy individual, yet a requirement to have 1,500 supporters will—unless that party actually has grassroots support. This legislation is saying to Clive Palmer, ‘Put your supporters where your mouth is, not where your money is.’ There is criticism from some new parties who should be more worried about themselves. If you start fact-checking the memes you are spreading, and start offering voters evidence based policy, perhaps 1,500 may be more achievable. I understand that Senator Lambie too is in opposition to this bill. This raises a good question for the government—oops, the Lib-Labs—to answer: why is it 1,500 voters for registration in a populous state and 1,500 in Tasmania? Shouldn’t it be some percentage of registered voters in that state?

The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Counting, Scrutiny and Operational Efficiencies) Bill 2021 makes a number of small changes to voting. These have been mentioned by other speakers and I will not review those here. How will all these changes affect the integrity of our elections? Well, we don’t know. We don’t know now and we won’t know afterwards because our elections are not audited. My interest in election integrity started in January 2021, following the US presidential election. My office was inundated with people asking about whether election fraud, such as it was in the United States, could be happening in Australia. The problem is not whether election fraud is happening; the problem is that people think it is happening. Confidence in election outcomes is central to democracy.

The restrictions around COVID have people at boiling point. Small business closures, job losses, high-handed bureaucrats and politics have reduced many people to desperation. The next election will be a powder keg. It is essential to ensure that, whatever the result, the public can accept it and move on. Suspicion of the outcome can be easily fuelled and turned into violence by those who seek to manipulate the result for their own ends. We cannot let this happen. It is for this reason that New South Wales and Western Australia have provisions in their electoral acts to audit state elections.

New South Wales conducts an audit before each election to ensure systems are fit for purpose and then audits again after each election to ensure integrity and to see what can be improved for next time. Western Australia audits after every election.

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 does not have audit provisions. In February, I started asking questions of the Australian Electoral Commission, the AEC. To be honest, I expected to hear that auditing was under control given the reputation the Australian Electoral Commission claims it has. That’s not what I found. The Australian Electoral Commission told me in Senate estimates that the Australian Signals Directorate had conducted an audit of the Australian Electoral Commission’s software. The next day in Senate estimates I asked the Australian Signals Directorate if they had done that audit and the answer was a clear no. The Australian Electoral Commission tried to conflate the security audit conducted by the Australian Signals Directorate with an audit of software and systems to pretend our software was being audited and, by extension, was fit for purpose. It has not been audited. The election software is not fit for purpose.

So why did the Australian Electoral Commission make a false statement or imply a false statement? The Australian Signals Directorate looked at potential intrusions into the system, both electronic and physical. Following the audit, the Australian Signals Directorate proceeded with an uplift program designed to harden the AEC network. I call that a fail. If your systems were audited for cybersecurity and the outcome was a comprehensive uplift program to improve your security then clearly the system failed the audit. What else would fail an audit at the Australian Electoral Commission?

In the May Senate estimates I asked the Australian Electoral Commission simple questions. When did the Australian Signals Directorate audit happen? The Australian Electoral Commission declined to answer. What was actually audited? The Australian Electoral Commission gave no useful response. What was the result of the audit? The Australian Electoral Commission declined to answer. What changes to the Australian Electoral Commission’s systems have been made in the uplift program? The Australian Electoral Commission declined to answer. Could the Australian Electoral Commission guarantee that the uplift program would render the Australian Electoral Commission computer system fit for purpose? The Australian Electoral Commission responded that nobody could ever guarantee their systems are fit for purpose. Let that sink in. Nobody could ever guarantee their systems are fit for purpose—the Australian Electoral Commission admitted it.

It is disturbing that such an audit could happen behind closed doors without direction or without structure. It is more disturbing still that this program has no legal basis in the Australian Commonwealth Electoral Act. We should not have to rely on the admirable conscientiousness of the Australian Signals Directorate. We should be able to rely on the completeness of our legislation. We need it fixed. It must be fixed.

Then I looked at other issues around election integrity. First up was a simple question: is the electronic data file containing each vote ever compared back to the paper ballot after the vote has been adjudicated? That answer is no. At no time is the electronic record of a vote checked back against the paper ballot. Senator Birmingham and the Australian Electoral Commission have assured us that there is a check, yet when we peer through the veil of language deliberately calculated to obfuscate no such check is happening, contrary to the minister’s response. The only time this happens is when a ballot is disputed and a paper ballot is pulled out for scrutiny. After the ballot is adjudicated, there is no further check.

These votes are sitting for up to a month in a system that failed an Australian Signals Directorate security test. Data integrity requires that a final audit be conducted immediately before declaration of the poll by pulling paper ballots out at random and comparing them back to the electronic record and vice versa. It’s one day’s work for all the counting staff as they finish their regular counting. It will not delay the result. It will guarantee that the system has not been compromised accidentally or by a malicious party.

My second question was on the accuracy of the voter rolls. The Australian Electoral Commission used to check the accuracy of their rolls by conducting residency checks.

Before this system was discontinued in 1995, those checks revealed a significant number of false registrations: people who had left the country, people who had died and people who had moved. Most of the incidences of multiple voting stem from voting in their old location and their new location: double voting. This legislation does not address that problem. How can anyone say that the voter roll is accurate if they never check it?

My third question is on the software algorithm at the Senate scanning centre that allocates preferences. The Australian Electoral Commission publishes what is basically a data dump of the raw vote count. Leading cryptographers, led by Dr Vanessa Teague, from the Australian National University, have written a check routine to test the preference flow against the published result. Their finding was that the Senate preference flow was correct, so we know this this aspect of the Australian Electoral Commission software works. Why it is up to the university academics to write complicated software at their own expense and on their own time to audit our elections? Since when did the government decide to crowdsource its job? So, what next? A GoFundMe page to pay for it?

This is why next week I will introduce into the Senate the Commonwealth electoral amendment (integrity of elections) bill 2021. This bill requires a preaudit of the Australian Electoral Commission systems prior to each election to ensure the systems are fit for purpose. It requires an audit after the election, as New South Wales and Western Australia require and as the ACT proposes. We propose an audit of the electoral roll and voter ID: voter identification. In short, this bill will audit the elections and the voter. Then we will all have confidence in the next election result.

After decades of this Lib-Lab parliament, people are starting to see how parliament is failing our country. The Lib-Lab duopoly, though, is desperate to continue its hold on a parliament that has a record of decades of not serving the people of Australia. We, though, are keen to restore parliamentary democracy. We have one flag, we are one community, we are one nation.

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Audit the election software

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I asked the AEC about the new software they used for counting votes. Concerns have been raised about previous AEC software by cryptologists and the National Audit Office.

The AEC claims to have written new software that fixes all of these problems, but they won’t tell us who audited it and what the results were. An open and transparent audit is absolutely necessary to ensure there is 100% confidence in our elections.

Transcript

Thank you, Miss Jay.

Thanks Senator Sullivan, Senator Roberts.

[Malcolm Roberts] Thank you. And thank you for appearing today. My questions apart from the first and third, fairly brief. So the first one, in reference to testimony at the last estimates, and I’ve I’ve got copies of your questions on that, responses to your questions and that is. The AEC bought but did not use the Scytl software. Rather you write your own. To write your own election software is a really impressive feat. We’ve been talking to people, they’re very impressed. May I ask how many staff are on the development team please?

I’d have to take that on notice.

[Malcolm Roberts] Okay. What was the total cost of doing that?

I’d have to take that on notice.

[Malcolm Roberts] Okay. What testing did you use before deployment now I’d imagine some kind of parallel running or some form of a dry run.

Well, in fact, we did multiple forms of testing and assurance Senator, as I’m sure you would as I’m sure you’d be aware. And look Senator, to be abundantly helpful here, we’re happy to provide you a more detailed personal briefing on this. I’m happy to talk to you about it. It is a complex process. As you’re aware, we’ve been using our audit, our checked software, easy CAAT for a number of years and we’ve redeveloped that that’s effectively what we deployed as part of the 2016 solution. As I think we said last time, the Siedel solution, we got Seidel on board as really as a business assurance process to make sure that we had software that was going to work at 12 week period to deliver it. The software we’re using has been checked, double-checked and assured. And not only that, the important point to note it’s totally in line with the existing legislation and all of the data that we then generate from that software is put online and the results are then replicated by a number of psephologists and political science departments who use that data to replicate the count. And it exactly matches the outcome of their own. So there’s a range of different ways of assuring that this software is fit for purpose.

[Malcolm Roberts] Okay, thank you. Still part of the first question. Were any of the staff involved doctorate or masters degree qualified in a suitable discipline such as mathematics or cryptology?

Senator I’d have to take that on notice.

[Malcolm Roberts] Could we get their names please? When you provide it a notice?

No.

[Malcolm Roberts] Okay. And how long did it take?

We had for the 2016 process we had that 12 week periods in Israel, as I’ve said previously.

[Malcolm Roberts] Yeah. And can you provide their qualifications?

Senator again, if you can help me here on letting me know where you’re trying to head, maybe I can provide some more fulsome answers.

[Malcolm Roberts] Perhaps we can, we can go into that in the briefing. I’d love to take you up on that. So did your bespoke solution use any code from Scytl and if so, what percentage?

It did not.

[Malcolm Roberts] None at all. Great. Your software, you intimated has been audited in accordance with standards published by the National Association of Testing Authorities, NADA. That certification does not specify a standard for the auditing of election software. It’s more of a general process for an audit to follow, as I understand it. Having the audit is not a guarantee that your software works within acceptable accuracy levels. Although these issues may come out in an audit who conducted the audit and how much did it cost and what was the result?

Senator as I’ve just said, if you can help me here by telling me where you’re trying to head with this process I would get some of these questions. If somehow the results of this were somehow secret or behind closed doors. We use a piece of software that’s been tested and assured on multiple occasions. The same time, all of the data that this software produces is then publicly published on our virtual teller even on our website, which on election day, as one of the most used pages in Australia, that data is then used by a variety of psephologists and computer and political science experts to replicate those results. It’s intensely public. If you’re trying to indicate that there’s some sort of issue, I just don’t understand why you’d be doing that when there’s been no evidence of that at all.

[Malcolm Roberts] Well, we were just concerned about the auditing. That’s all. Because we got some answers from the, I think it was a Nao that didn’t give us the assurance. So let’s go onto some of the physical things then of the 511 polling places in the last election. How many of those had computers or other devices that communicated with the AEC computer system or were capable of doing so?

Senator I’m Jeff Pope, deputy electoral commissioner. I’m not sure what you’re referring to with 511 polling places we had nearly 8,000.

[Malcolm Roberts] Could that be state?

Perhaps you might be referring to–

[Malcolm Roberts] While it is not a mandatory requirement for pre-poll voting centres at the 2019 federal election. 115 of the 511 people voting centres. So pre-poll, sorry, pre-poll. My mistake.

[Man] Right.

[Malcolm Roberts] Had me worried there.

You had me worried.

[Malcolm Roberts] Well, just how many have got a physical connection? How many had a physical connection?

For what purpose, Senator?

[Malcolm Roberts] Well, I’m going to go into that in the next few questions.

Many in terms of the role. And–

There are, we have electronic certified lists in every I think in every one of those pre-poll centres last event where citizens names and marked off the roll.

[Malcolm Roberts] No, it’s beyond that. I note from your answer on questions on notice F-O six five on polling place security, that those electronic devices were protected by monitored back to base alarm in only 115 of the 511 polling places. Were any other measures in place to protect the cyber integrity of those devices during the election period? For example were they air gaped, were they turned off at night, was there IP traffic monitoring for the period when they should have been none because they were turned off? That’s what we’re after.

I think all of your thoughts–

[Malcolm Roberts] You think?–

So we’ll take it on notice. But again, we’ve had no issue with any breach of our software or our hardware, with respect to delivery of the election–

At all, and no indicator of any breach and our handling of all of that data. And the physical equipment was in line with relevant Commonwealth guidelines and regulations and the risk assessment that we undertook.

[Malcolm Roberts] Okay. I’m just doing my job on behalf of my constituents.

I get it Senator. And I’m doing my job.

[Malcolm Roberts] Yes.

On also defending one of the world’s best and most transparent electoral systems.

[Malcolm Roberts] Well I’m not attacking it. I’m just making sure that–

Fantastic. And so we’re both doing our jobs in terms of making sure that citizens have the information they need to form their judgements.

[Malcolm Roberts] Correct. I’ve only got three questions to go. In your response to questions on notice F-0 six eight, you make the comment, ” All preferences and all Senate ballot papers are reviewed by at least one person at the scanning side.” Does that mean that they compare the scanned ballot with the paper ballot to ensure accuracy? Because that’s the impression your answer gives. Do they compare the actual scanned ballot with the paper ballot?

Senator the process is that a data is both manually entered and scanned and then that’s matched with the automated process–

[Malcolm Roberts] All the ballot papers are manually entered?

Manually entered but all paper is scanned when it first arrives. Then from that image which is an image that data is then entered. And then the scan, the data from the scan is then compared with that to make sure that they match. Where they don’t match, we undertake further processes.

[Malcolm Roberts] Could you explain that in terms of, we have a physical paper ballot that is scanned in–

[Man] Correct.

[Malcolm Roberts] And then–

And then it captures an image.

[Malcolm Roberts] Right. And then what is compared with that image?

That image is then presented to the Data Entry Operator who enters the data from that image–

[Malcolm Roberts] From the image–

Right.

[Malcolm Roberts] So he or she enters it physically.

Correct.

[Malcolm Roberts] So that’s the manual part.

That’s the manual part, then at the same time the data capture process as part of capturing the image is then compared with that manual process. Where that matches, that’s taken to be an accurate match. And that’s included in the count. Where it doesn’t match, we undertake further processes.

[Malcolm Roberts] So that last estimates in October, I asked what percentage of computer records that checked back against the paper record. And you took that on notice, your lengthy answer failed to provide a figure. Is that because it’s a hundred percent?

Which was the question Senator?

[Malcolm Roberts] I asked what percentage of computer records are checked back against the paper record? And you took that a notice, your lengthy answer, which is I think F-068. Hang on, it might be zero eight four. Sorry, zero eight, four. So, as I was saying your lengthy answer failed to provide a figure. Counting ballots is a quantitative exercise. So everything comes down to figures. What percentage of electronic voting cards are compared back to the ballot paper and what is the variance?

I wonder whether we’re talking about different things here, Senator. The process that I’ve just been through demonstrates that every single paper.

[Malcolm Roberts] Thank you.

Yep.

[Malcolm Roberts] Last question . On this topic, anyway. Has the AEC ever run a test batch of a few thousand ballot papers through your system then run those same ballots through a second time and compared the result? Surely any variance between these two runs would give you a figure for system accuracy.

Again, Senator I’d rely on what I’ve just said before that the process that we’re running involves a full manual entry of every single ballot paper compared then to the scanning, capture of the scanned data. So we’re doing that in any case.

[Malcolm Roberts] That that’s what I thought. Okay. Just a final question. Just to lose question. I was thinking as, the senators were asking questions. Voters tell us quite often that they’re then not in favour of being assaulted by a number of how to vote cards distributors being volunteers, distributing how to vote cards when they’re entering a polling booth and some of the premises managers getting to have a bit of strife with it too. I don’t know. I haven’t read the act that covers this, but would there be any possibility or any consideration given to putting the, how to vote cards in the booth or is that fundamentally flawed?

Absolutely not Senator yet. I know what you’re saying that occasionally people do so that. What I’d say in defensive 99.9% of all of the party workers is most people strive to do the right thing.

[Man] Yeah.

We have a few over-excited individuals that really like to get those how to vote cards in the hands of voters. And that can cause some offence but most people do the right thing. We would never put a how to votes in the polling place, because then get confused and think we’re endorsing a particular process and it creates grief.

[Malcolm Roberts] What about if everyone was in there? Every party.

Same thing people then get confused and I’d be absolutely–

[Malcolm Roberts] That’s a fair comment. So if someone’s handing it they can stop them and ask questions about it. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Senator Roberts.

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