Defence generals tell me that, despite a large number of troops being relocated to Townsville during a housing crisis, there’s no problem with finding accommodation for our diggers. This claim comes despite Townsville having a “dangerously low” rental vacancy rate of just 1%.
If you or your family are experiencing difficulties in finding accommodation after being directed to move to Townsville, please email my office as I’d like to hear from you.
Transcript
Senator ROBERTS: How many extra people have been moved to Townsville? What numbers will Townsville increase by and are there adequate homes in Townsville?
Senator McAllister: I think, as part of your answer, Lieutenant General Stuart, you might respond to the first part of the senator’s question, which was about making diggers homeless. You may wish to include a response to that in your answer.
Lt Gen. Stuart: That’s just not a factually correct statement. We’re not making soldiers homeless. We have a plan that’s been worked through with our team mates in the Security and Estate Group, who are our liaison with Defence Housing, and manage the on-base accommodation. And, of course, we have a very strong relationship with local government in Townsville. It’s a staged plan, over the next three career management cycles, the first of which is—
Senator ROBERTS: What’s a management cycle—how long?
Lt Gen. Stuart: It’s a posting cycle—every 12 months. The moves occur roughly between December, January and February. This coming posting cycle will see the first of those soldiers that have volunteered, or have been asked to, go to Townsville to have those skills that we are building in the brigade there. To go to your point about shortages in some of our numbers, we are well under our authorised strength in Townsville. So the additional numbers don’t actually fall above the authorised strength in the next two years. That is notwithstanding the fact that the rental market in Townsville is quite tight.
Senator ROBERTS: It’s tight all over Australia—almost at record levels because of massive immigration. Immigration has doubled the previous records, so I understand the dilemma. So what you’re saying is that you understand the housing pressures, but you’re managing that?
https://img.youtube.com/vi/81viFiQupe8/maxresdefault.jpg7201280Senator Malcolm Robertshttps://www.malcolmrobertsqld.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/One-Nation-Logo1-300x150.pngSenator Malcolm Roberts2024-11-20 14:48:082024-11-20 14:53:17Defence Claims No Housing Issues for Troops in Townsville
The shiny generals at Defence headquarters have spent huge amounts of taxpayer money on recruitment, yet the number of people employed has declined.
I’m worried that the Defence Force is stocking their numbers with university educated desk jockeys rather than the fighters we need.
Let’s see how they respond to this on notice.
Transcript
Senator ROBERTS: The defence minister has proudly declared this week the Defence Force is growing again. I’ve read what I think is your statement, and I’ve certainly read the secretary’s statement. Is the official one—yes, it is your statement.
Adm. Johnston: From this afternoon?
Senator ROBERTS: Yes.
Adm. Johnston: Yes, that’s my statement.
Senator ROBERTS: The last time we heard that we were on a growth path, Senator Shoebridge pointed out you were actually on a shrink path going backwards in personnel. How many infantry sergeant positions do you have across the Army?
Adm. Johnston: I might invite the Chief of Army to come up to better answer that question.
Lt Gen. Stuart: While I’m looking for the specific numbers, I would offer to you that the sergeant rank is one of the areas where we are significantly under the requirement. I’ll have to come back to you with those numbers.
Senator ROBERTS: In June, you confirmed you were deficient by 143 sergeants. You said that you were responding to this with ‘early promotion opportunities’. That just sounds like you may be skipping people ahead without the necessary experience. How many corporals have you early promoted?
Lt Gen. Stuart: I don’t have that number on me. You’re correct that one of the ways of filling those supervisory gaps is to promote people earlier than we would otherwise do. But, in order to do that, we obviously have an obligation, and it makes sense to invest in those individuals in terms of their own development and then, through our collective training, make sure that we step up the rate of experience that they’re able to glean. For example—
Senator ROBERTS: I think I understand what you’re getting at. They must have the necessary experience, and you want to promote them to give them more experience. I get that. How many corporals have you early promoted? Could you get that on notice, please?
Lt Gen. Stuart: I can get you that on notice. I don’t have it with me.
Senator ROBERTS: Also take on notice the number of infantry sergeant positions you have across the Army.
Lt Gen. Stuart: Will do.
Senator ROBERTS: What is your current headcount for ECN 343, the infantry soldiers?
Lt Gen. Stuart: Again, I don’t have those figures to hand, but we’re doing quite well when it comes to ECN 343 privates.
Senator ROBERTS: What has the headcount for ECN 343 been over previous periods? Could you put that on notice too?
Lt Gen. Stuart: It’s been reasonably healthy. If I recall, it’s north of 90 per cent in terms of the fill rates. It’s not an area that’s on the—
Senator ROBERTS: I’d like the actual headcount for the last five years, please, including the latest year.
Lt Gen. Stuart: Sure.
Senator ROBERTS: Are you padding out the Defence Force numbers with non-combat roles to look good on the headline number?
Lt Gen. Stuart: No.
Senator ROBERTS: Could you please provide on notice your headcount for combat versus non-combat roles over the previous five years?
Lt Gen. Stuart: I just want to make sure I get you the right information here. Are you talking about across the entire Army or in infantry battalions?
Senator ROBERTS: Infantry battalions and Army as well, please.
Lt Gen. Stuart: So you want a breakdown from ECN 343, which is infantry. There are other infantry ECNs, as well, in our special operations. Would you like those included?
Senator ROBERTS: I would like to know basically how many are actual fighting, operational people and how many are non-combat roles. I want to make sure that we’re not padding figures with non-combat people.
Lt Gen. Stuart: I can assure you we’re not padding any figures—
Senator ROBERTS: I’d like to see that.
Lt Gen. Stuart: Of course, combat in terms of functions, is broader than just infantry. It includes armour, which includes tank and cavalry, combat engineers and artillery and air defence as well as field artillery.’
Senator ROBERTS: You’re going beyond my capability at the moment
Lt Gen. Stuart: I just want to make sure—
Senator ROBERTS: I’d like to know how many are non-combat roles and how many are combat roles.
Lt Gen. Stuart: Everyone in a formation is in a combat role. The function that they perform will differ across three functional lines: combat, combat support and combat services support. Obviously, each of those begins with ‘combat’ because we fight as teams but people fulfill different roles in those teams, if that makes sense.
Senator ROBERTS: I’ll leave it, as a matter of trust, in your hands. I’d like to know how many are combat and how many are non-combat. I know you’ve just explained that to me, but it doesn’t have a lot of meaning in my mind. I’d like to know what the numbers are, combat and non-combat, if you can give me the flavour for that and explain it.
Lt Gen. Stuart: We’ll endeavour to do our very best. I’ll give you a full breakdown across the Army in terms of combat, combat support and combat service support, and we’ll make sure that you get a breakdown in terms of core and the specifics in relation to ECN.
Senator ROBERTS: And if you could define the terms, please.
Lt Gen. Stuart: Yes, we will.
Senator ROBERTS: Thank you. I’ve got no or minimal understanding of the Army, so treat me as completely ignorant.
Lt Gen. Stuart: We’d be very happy to sit down with you and give you the army 101 brief, if that would be helpful, Senator.
Senator ROBERTS: It may be, but let’s get the figures first. Thank you so much for the offer.
Angus Campbell’s DSC (Distinguished Service Cross) is still a live issue and retiring won’t bury it. Now we know Campbell’s replacement, CDF Johnston, was the person who nominated Campbell for his DSC.
Johnston maintains he was just doing what everyone else did at the time. He did not disclose the specific action, with enemy forces in contact, he saw Campbell in that justified a combat award.
Anyone hoping that there would be new type of direction and integrity leading the Defence Force might be worried that this doesn’t signal a change of pace.
Transcript
Senator ROBERTS:What about leadership and integrity and truth?
Adm. Johnston: That was the third in terms of what I understood when you said ‘culture’: leadership is key to culture.
Senator ROBERTS: We are on the same track. There’s been a long process, revisited over multiple years now, of estimates sessions, questions on notice and freedom of information requests on a particular issue. You’ve been in this room while I questioned your predecessor, Angus Campbell, over his Distinguished Service Cross, which I’m sure you will recall. Admiral Johnston, you were the officer who recommended Angus Campbell for that Distinguished Service Cross, weren’t you?
Adm. Johnston: I was on the nomination for it, yes, that’s right.
Senator ROBERTS: According to Defence freedom of information request 522/23, you recommended him for that award on 29 September 2011. At that time, the criteria for the Distinguished Service Cross required the recipient to be ‘in action’. Admiral Johnston, can you, once and for all, as a person who recommended Angus Campbell for his DSC, clarify what contact with the enemy you saw General Campbell in, in action, that led to your recommending him for a combat medal?
Adm. Johnston: If I could answer—the nomination was provided to me in my role as the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations at the time. That position has, as one of its responsibilities, to look at the performance of commanders in our deployed forces, of which General Campbell was one at the time. So I progressed the nomination because of the function that I had in Joint Operations Command. I did, as part of that, indicate that the submission of the nomination should be after the period when General Campbell completed his tenure, which was the case. The definition of ‘in action’ that I applied is consistent with that which had been standing for some time, as to commanders—and certainly in General Campbell’s case, I believe, he spent more than 100 days in Afghanistan, as part of his command role, in an area that was classified as a warlike zone.
Senator ROBERTS: ‘A warlike zone’?
Adm. Johnston: Yes.
Senator ROBERTS: Was he in a war zone?
Adm. Johnston: Yes.
Senator ROBERTS: And facing fire?
Adm. Johnston: He was, as part of his duties, rotating through the places where Australian soldiers and others were located, experiencing the same threats as they had in those locations.
Senator ROBERTS: What is your definition of ‘in action’?
Adm. Johnston: The definition I applied is the same as what had been applied by my predecessors and over, I think, eight commanders prior to General Campbell, who had been nominated for a Distinguished Service Cross. It was an individual who is operating in an area where it is a warlike zone and there are threats from hostile forces.
Senator ROBERTS: Did that definition come into place the day after his nomination? I think beforehand it was direct action.
Adm. Johnston: The definition changed before his nomination, but the application of what we understood that to be is consistent before General Campbell’s nomination.
Transparency and accountability are essential in a democracy, yet this government continues to hide behind a curtain of secrecy, especially when it comes to the higher brass in the Department of Defence.
The refusal to release the 20-year review of the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force isn’t about national security—it’s about avoiding embarrassment. We need a process that allows senators to confidentially review sensitive documents, ensuring accountability while protecting the public interest. We must demand a government that serves the people, not itself.
One Nation will fight for our Defence Force personnel to be treated fairly by senior officers. One standard must apply to all.
Transcript
Well, the minister’s explanation is pitiful. Look at paragraph (a)(iv) of Senator Lambie and Senator Shoebridge’s motion. Senator Wong failed to comply. She did not provide the names. Who has been consulted in relation to the release of the report of the 20-year review of the office of the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force? Why is the government continuing to hide? This is the stuff that comes out of the south end of a northbound bull. This is the government’s response. The claim isn’t that there was anything classified in the report of the 20-year review of the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force that Senator Lambie had been seeking; the claim the minister makes is that this report wasn’t meant to be released because the government didn’t want it to be released, not that national security was under threat, not that there was classified information in it. The government didn’t want it to be released because that would be embarrassing and they would be asked to do something about it. That’s not good enough.
An order to produce documents that passes this Senate is constitutionally superior to acts of law. The government doesn’t get to decide that they can toss those orders in the bin. This is a rare occasion where we get to see the report even though the government refused to hand it over. Credit must go to Senator Lambie and Senator Shoebridge for pushing this and to their offices for managing to get a copy of the report. Usually, as senators, we’re left in the dark. The government makes a public interest immunity claim and refuses to hand over anything. The government tells us that if this report was released the sky would fall in, that there would be an earthquake that shatters the public interest. Now, as senators, we’re quite reasonable and responsible. We know that truth reinforces truth. While we might desperately want that information we somewhat trust that the government hasn’t lied to our face and that there would be an actual risk to the public interest if the document were published. Yesterday and today show once and for all, yet again, that the government is completely undeserving of that trust.
The minister’s explanation clearly isn’t sufficient, and the current process for ordering documents is failing the Australian people and the senators seeking information on behalf of the people—information that belongs to the Australian people. To that end, I’ll again be proposing a new, additional way for handling orders for documents. When ministers make a public interest immunity claim, the claimed harm results from releasing the document to the public. There’s a way to make sure this is a win-win. I’ll go through it again. It’s making sure sensitive information isn’t released while at the same time ensuring senators get the information needed to make informed decisions. The way to do this is to establish a process for senators to confidentially review ordered documents without releasing them to the public.
This proposal may sound familiar to some. I first raised it in 2022, and this Senate supported a reference to the Procedure Committee for inquiry. With respect to the senators on that committee, the response was lacking. The inquiry was given four months to report on the issue, did not seek any submissions and produced the Procedure Committee’s first report of 2023 of a towering two pages. While the committee declined to endorse the proposal, they did confirm that it’s feasible. The committee committed to further report on the process for the order for the production of documents later in 2023. No report was delivered. Imagine that. Given the increased frequency of orders for the production of documents and the nearly blanket ban the government seems to be applying on transparency, it’s time to deal with this issue again.
This proposal is relatively simple. If the minister makes a public interest immunity claim, they wouldn’t have to release it to the public but they would have to release it to us—the senators—confidentially. A majority of the Senate could then decide whether the minister’s claim is legitimate and the document deserves to be kept secret from the public. It’s true that, just like a normal order for the production of documents, the minister could refuse to hand over the documents to the committee. Since no harm could flow from public disclosure in this process, it would be apparent that the only harm the government would want to avoid would be embarrassment. That gives us a better reason to apply sanctions for noncompliance, which the Senate is rightly cautious to do under the current process. In making a public interest immunity claim the minister would be automatically required to nominate a standing committee to receive the document, and only senators would be allowed to review it.
I will be submitting a notice of motion with some draft amendments to the standing orders for senators to consider over the break. I welcome their input and any suggestions to make these changes better. The Australian public deserves transparency, and as the Senate, the house of review, we must deliver accountability on this government. Recent weeks in this chamber have shown debacle after debacle. The government is in chaos. Australia has a chaotic government, and the people pay for that—enlisted people and veterans pay for it. The Senate’s scrutiny will help the government to govern and reduce the chaos. We are willing to help you, and that’s what our help will do. The people deserve the truth, openness and accountability. (Time expired)
A report revealed from a motion I put into the Senate, that the government kept a helicopter flying for more than 5 years with a defective engine part.
That MRH-90 helicopter that crashed in Jervis Bay without any fatalities was a stroke of luck. Four months later, another helicopter crashed in the Whitsundays, resulting in the death of four Defence personnel. This report reveals that senior “leadership” of Defence was willing to put people’s lives at risk with defective engine parts. The question must be asked – how many other risks were they willing to overlook or explain away?
One Nation backs our Defence Personnel. The Government can’t claim they do unless they hold senior members of the Defence Department accountable for their failures.
Transcript
I rise to speak on the document produced in response to order for the production of documents No. 200. This order relates to the MRH-90 Taipan helicopter crash in Jervis Bay in May 2023. The helicopter call sign Bushman 82 was hovering low to water on a training exercise, with divers suspended below, when it experienced a catastrophic failure of its left-hand engine. The helicopter ditched into the water—in a stroke of luck, without any fatalities. Just one month later, Defence gave the MRH-90 helicopter a completely clean bill of health and authorised it to continue flying. The Senate agreed to this OPD in May 2023, requiring Defence to hand over any safety reports and documents in relation to the crash. We wanted to know how Defence had certified the helicopter as safe so quickly after such a significant incident. In defiance of the order of this Senate, the Minister for Defence refused to hand over any documents, citing an ongoing internal investigation, despite the helicopter already being back in the air, threatening lives. The government and Defence advised that that investigation should conclude in October 2023.
In June 2023, a month after, the Senate reiterated its order for the documents in motion 243, with a new deadline of November in accordance with the advice of the government. We gave them a go. They failed to produce even a response to that order until the Senate sought an explanation in December of 2023. We can see how time marches on and is irrelevant to Defence.
Now we fast forward to September 2024, 18 months after the crash and nearly a year after the government promised to respond. We finally have a response and documents, yet it is not a compliant response. It’s a redacted version of an executive summary to a single report. The order very clearly specified ‘all incident reports, safety evaluations, briefing notes, correspondence and information held by the Department of Defence, the defence minister or the defence minister’s office’. The executive summary to one report clearly doesn’t satisfy this request.
Minister, where are your briefing notes? Where is your correspondence? Are you telling the Senate that you and your office had nothing to say about the Jervis Bay ditching? The executive summary is dated 2 August 2024. That’s three months and two weeks ago. Did Defence sit on this report before giving it to the minister? Why the delay? The six pages of redacted executive summary we do have are from the Defence Flight Safety Bureau’s aviation safety investigation report. From what we do have, a few things are clear:
The engine failure was caused by the rupture of Blade 34 from the High Pressure 1 (HP1) wheel in the High Pressure Turbine (HPT).
They know the cause. Another quote reads:
… in 2017, as a result of several HP1 failures across the global fleet, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) issued a NH90 Service Bulletin recommending that operators … replace HP 1 blades with modified blades.
Another quote reads:
The investigation highlighted that there was no definitive evidence of the completion and recording of hazard analysis and safety risk assessments related to HP 1 failures during MRH-90 PCS operations.
Defence decided to keep flying the helicopters without the modified parts and eventually get around to it while failing to consider and document the risk that these things would lose an engine during low-level flight because of this. In 2023, five years after the bulletin was given to Defence, Bushman 82 was still flying in Jervis Bay, without the recommended modified parts.
This report, while not compliant with the Senate’s order, is important because it again demonstrates Defence was willing to overlook serious risks when it came to this helicopter—risks involving lives. How many other problems with the MRH-90 helicopter did Defence overlook? How many times did they allow this thing back in the air, knowing it would unnecessarily put our defence personnel at needless risk? How many potentially catastrophic issues, like the TopOwl headset, were supposedly mitigated or did Defence just explain away?
These documents are important because this helicopter should have been pulled from service a decade ago. The MRH-90 should have been permanently grounded after Bushman 82 ditched into Jervis Bay—the latest, at the time, of a series of incidents. It wasn’t pulled from service, and, four months later, Bushman 83 crashed in the Whitsundays, resulting in the death of four personnel: Warrant Officer Class 2 Joseph Phillip Laycock—Phil, as he was known; troop commander Captain Danniel Lyon; Lieutenant Maxwell Nugent; and Corporal Alexander Naggs. May they rest in peace. Blood is on the hands of the Defence leadership and successive defence ministers who kept this helicopter in the air when it belonged on the ground. I seek leave to continue my remarks later.
Submissions to the inquiry looking at Defence Medals, including diggers getting screwed over and Angus Campbell’s DSC, are closing soon [30 August 2024].
