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⚠️ Keep an eye out for this. The information you provide goes back to the LNP (or Labor) campaign office in Brisbane where they take your personal details and then bombard you with calls, letters and emails ahead of the election.

Keppel Candidate James Ashby explains how to keep yourself safe from this scam. If you’d like a postal vote ahead of the October 26 Queensland Election – call the Electoral Commission Queensland on 1300 881 665 or visit: https://event.elections.qld.gov.au/Events/ElectorSearch?EventID=632&EventType=1

There’s a lot of shady money flowing around our elections. One example is the weird case of nearly $50 million dollars flowing from coal mining company Glencore eventually making its way to the Labor party that wants to shut them down.

Nearly $50 million in two years flowed from Glencore’s subsidiary company Abelshore to the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMMEU). The CFMMEU donates tens of millions to the Australian Labor party every year. Why would a coal mining company funnel millions of dollars to a union that donates to the Labor Party who hates coal mining and wants it shut down under its net-zero plans?

Pay attention to my questions at the Fair Work Commission about the unions and labour hire companies colluding to rip off hundreds of thousands of dollars from coal miners for some potential answers.

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: Maybe you could elaborate on some of the issues faced with getting a clear picture when it comes to donation law, a really complex situation. The returns for the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union for 2022 and 2023 show they donated huge sums to the Labor Party. The CFMMEU has received more than $39 million from a company called Abelshore, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of coal company Glencore. In 2021-22 they donated $9 million, so over two years they donated $48 million donated by Glencoreowned companies to the CFMMEU, to the Labor Party. So you have tens of millions, $48 million as I said, flying from a coal company through a subsidiary, through a union to the Labor Party but the coal company does not show up in the returns to the Labor Party. Can you explain the difficulties in finding out where the money was originally coming from on the returns that are lodged?  

Mr Rogers: First of all, I have not seen that particular return, so I would have to take it on notice and have a look but I am not aware that any of that breaches the existing legislation. Our role is to adhere to the legislation, promote the legislation, ensure that agencies are adhering to that. As you know, the whole funding and disclosure issue is the most complex part of the Electoral Act. It is highly technical. As long as those entities are meeting their obligations for transparency under the act, and I have no information that they are not—I would have to look at that specific issue in detail—as long as they are within the legislation, changing that legislation is a matter for parliament rather than the AEC, which I know you are aware of, and it is something we were discussing earlier this evening. I would have to have a look at in detail.  

Senator ROBERTS: Yes, we will send you a copy. It is on a register from the CFMMEU, I think I said. That is an awful lot of money to be hidden and it is not deliberately hidden. Perhaps it is inadvertently hidden. I think the intent is deliberate because it seems a bit strange that money is going from a coal company to a mining union to the Labor Party. 

We receive many questions about the integrity of elections and observations from members of the public and volunteers at polling booths.

We investigated the many concerns that people have and provide answers to the most common questions asked.

If you have further questions, please feel free to contact us.


Click Here for FAQ

Q1: The count for elections and referendums is undertaken by over 100,000+ temporary election workers. Is it possible that political activists can work their way into responsible positions in the AEC to interfere with ballot box content? 

A1: This is true, however the degree by which this affects the result is likely to be small, if at all, for two reasons: 

(a) The ability to make a significant change in results is limited by AEC procedures. 

(b) Activist involvement is compensatory. This means one party may influence a booth in one location, whereas an opposing party will do the same elsewhere. This is not ideal but it renders such fraud pointless, which is why little actual proof exists of such things occurring. 

Q2: The AEC claims its processes are open and transparent. Surely this can only be true if all staff are honest, which in the present highly charged political environment is unlikely. Is election integrity being assessed on a staff basis? 

A2: The behaviour of the AEC over the three years my team has been scrutinising their operations is anything BUT open and transparent. It is because the AEC refuse to answer in a full and honest manner that there is a lack of confidence in their operation. 

In a booth of any significant size however, the AEC staff are most likely to keep each other honest because of those competing political sympathies.  

We do not believe the integrity issue is a staff-based one, rather the issue is in their systems and specifically the quality of the voter roll and security over ballots and electronic records during counting. 

Q3: AEC supervisors leave temporary election workers without direct monitoring despite claims by the AEC that this does not occur. Supervisors are seen chatting outside polling stations leaving temp staff unsupervised. Why is this not addressed? 

A3: It would be unlikely that the booth Supervisor was the only experienced person there, however any specific examples of this should be reported to the AEC here. If no suitable response is received, please let us know via contact us.

Q4: An AEC supervisor was seen with a bundle of ballot-box sealing zip-ties all with the same serial number and was seen taking ballot boxes home from the pre-poll. Why are they getting away with this? 

A4: Zip-tie numbers are logged and, we are told, reconciled. There should only be one number per box and numbers should only be used once. Anyone with specific information to prove otherwise are invited to contact our office via contact us

Transport of ballots in private vehicles is allowed by the legislation, but it is our view that it should not be happening. Secure transport should be used and this secure transport should include time logs and surveillance cameras on the cargo, with point-to-point transit. 

Q5: Auditing means the count is undertaken at least twice and is done by different counting teams. What if the ballots were swapped for different ballots on the kitchen table of an activist employee’s home when the pre-poll closed for the night? That is still a rigged election, isn’t it? 

A5: The initial count is compared back to the final count by the AEC and party scrutineers. There is no evidence of a major variance capable of affecting a House of Reps or Senate outcome. Indeed, the closer the electorate the more effective the scrutineer system becomes. 

One Nation has not received any proof such rigging is happening. If you have any information that proves otherwise, this can be provided to the AEC here. If no suitable response is received, please let us know via contact us,

As a general discussion though – can ballot boxes go astray and ballots be substituted? Theoretically this is possible given that ballot boxes are not securely transported and the quality of the seals is an issue. One Nation supports secure, point-to-point transport in a vehicle with video and GPS surveillance to remove any chance of ballot substitution. 

Q6: The AEC’s rigorous chain-of-custody mechanisms are open to abuse, as the last pre-poll supervisor out of the building can simply double back and load up his private car with sealed ballot boxes. 

A6: One Nation has not received any proof this is happening. If you have any information that proves otherwise, this can be provided to the AEC here. If no suitable response is received, please let us know via contact us.

We believe video surveillance and alarms with a check on “arm” and “disarm” times should be the absolute minimum requirement for a secure pre-poll or regional counting centre. We use the same venues election after election, so the cost of this is justified by the magnitude of the task these venues perform. 

Q7: Although all AEC staff are required to sign a declaration of political neutrality, this in reality means nothing. Activists don’t care about declarations, contracts, laws, fairness, justice, or the will of the people. Is there a way to ensure no activists are employed during the election? 

A7: It is not possible to find 100,000+ poll workers with no political allegiance. What matters is a multi-faceted secure system to ensure political loyalty does not affect their work.  

In my early days in the workforce I received some great advice about security – ‘opportunity creates its own temptation’. It is a basic responsibility of management to ensure staff are protected by removing temptation from them.  

We do not believe the AEC has done this to a sufficient degree. 

Q8: The AEC systems are incredibly easy for activist employees to defeat because the security is far too weak. How can this be improved? 

A8: The AEC provides many layers of security and integrity in their processes. Recent legislation, which was authored by One Nation and passed by the LNP Government, added auditing of the count and auditing of the computer system to eliminate computer fraud. These were important reforms. 

One Nation will pursue video and alarm surveillance of pre-polls and regional counting centres, an audit of the voter rolls and secure transport of ballot boxes. More detail on this can be found in this FAQ. 

Q9: Can procedural changes be made that ensure only Australian citizens vote and they vote only once, that ballots cannot be swapped once lodged and that the ballots are properly counted? 

A9: This is already a requirement of our law. The question is to what degree is the law being complied with? In practice, this would require an audit of the voter roll (which One Nation is calling for) to ensure accurate rolls.

Voter ID is essential to voting integrity.

Refer to answers 4 and 6 above around ballot security and transport.

One Nation believes the actual count itself is conducted as accurately as is possible, given the issues that arise around human error on the part of counting staff and voters. This is often made worse by the shocking state of some returned ballots.

Q10: Would it be better if voting was paper only, in person, with ID and on the day? 

A10: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. If pre-poll is conducted properly, it is not an issue for voting integrity. We have some concerns around current pre-poll systems – refer to answers above.

One Nation would like the AEC to take a serious look at blockchain-based online voting. There are some University Academics who propose a very good way for this to be done without the possibility of fraud. 

Q11: Could postal votes be restricted to those that are overseas, in hospital or care homes, with all ballots to be received by election day? 

A11: Postal voting needs to be replaced as soon as possible with secure online voting. There are ways to do that accurately and without opening the door to fraud. 

Q12: Current ballot boxes are not fit for purpose. What would it take to ensure ballot boxes are large, heavy and constructed of transparent material, kept under strong lights, continually videoed online, stored in the National Archive for any citizen to access in the future, and under constant observation by party scrutineers and members of the public? 

A12: The cardboard boxes you place your ballot in are not used to transport ballots. Once full, they are switched out to sealed, transparent plastic containers. This is safe to transport, however One Nation are still investigating issues around the accuracy and tamper-proof capacity of the seals, current use of private cars to transport ballots instead of secure transport, alarms and video monitoring of pre-poll and regional counting centres.  

Q13: How can we provide a system where the ballots must be counted with the same uninterrupted security and scrutiny, and continue until finalised? 

A13: This is just not workable. Many voting places are school buildings which need to be accessible for teaching staff and children on the Monday. The use of regional voting centres is necessary. Counting 24/7 is expensive and it may be very hard to find staff willing to do that. 

An accurate count relies on accurate systems with foolproof security, not continuous count. 

Q14: Wouldn’t it be better for elections if computers or scanners were not used in the counting, tallying, or reporting? What if counting was done by accountable individuals? What if there was always at least two different candidate scrutineers or members of the public per staff member. 

A14: This is actually the system now with the sole difference being that the Senate preference flow is provided by a scan of the voting paper. Thanks to One Nation legislation passed by the previous LNP Government, there is now an audit on that count and for some months now an audit has been underway into the AEC computer system to ensure integrity in the next election. 

The preference flow is also checked by a third-party group comprised of University Academics and they have not found errors that affected the result. Indeed, they show the preference flow is very accurate. 

Q15: The AEC “disinformation register” is an affront to the Australian public. A transparency system would be far more useful. When bureaucrats exceed their authority as public servants paid from the taxes of hard-working Australians, what mechanisms can we put in place to ensure these petty tyrants are removed from their positions? 

A15: The disinformation register is an area One Nation are investigating. The idea had some merit, but its implementation seems biased against minor parties.  

Q16: What has changed since these findings below? 

  •  “the electoral system is open to manipulation is beyond question  … Fraudulent enrolment is almost impossible to prevent.”  (NSW Electoral Commissioners, Messrs R. Cundy and Ian Dickson, in the NSW Government Inquiry 1989.  
  • Electoral fraud, malpractice and errors are a common feature of the Australian electoral system, Alex Howen, Metropolitan  Vice-Pres of the NSW Liberal Party 11/9/1999. 
  • 78% of several thousand people voted “Yes” on www.publicdebate.com.au in year 2001 to the question Should a Royal Commission be held into Electoral Fraud?”  
  • The Shepherdson Inquiry in Queensland found that ALP members had done Vote Frauds in 1986, 1993 and 1996.  This was an evidential finding by a Judge 

A16: Historical cases are unlikely to inform current electoral process, although it does show that the ALP and LNP will cheat if an opportunity arises. One Nation is calling for further electoral reform.

Q17: Recent data showed that millions of dollars of corporate “donations” continue to fill the coffers of the major parties and that 40% of money received is not disclosed at all. I would like to see the following reforms legislated ASAP, including real-time disclosure of all donations over $2,500, banning big political donations altogether, and limiting electoral spending by parties and corporations. How will you ensure that these reforms are part of the recommendations made in the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters?  

A17: One Nation supports improving electoral disclosure laws and extending those to cover third party financing such as the Teals used in 2022. However, be aware that both the LNP and ALP vote together to maintain the status quo in this area. 

Q18: Should voters stop using a pencil when filling out a ballot paper? 

A18: There is no reason you can’t use your own black ball point pen (please ensure it writes clearly). Pencils are used simply because of cost and can be stored and used again without the ink running dry.

Q19: The AEC says that “Staff are obligated to report any suspicious activity to their supervisor.” – but this doesn’t mean a group of activist employees would do so. How can we ensure the AEC is free from infiltration by activists? 

A19: The AEC certainly harbours activists, however it is impossible to hire 100,000 people and not get activists. There is no system in the world that can stop that. The “people” factor is the wrong way to look at it. If the systems are properly secure, remote monitored and alarmed, ballots transported securely (not by AEC staff), and the voter rolls audited with rolling audits, then the few “bad eggs” that creep in will not be able to do any harm

Q20: It seems obvious that the main parties won’t fix the mess the AEC has become even though the commission itself says, “The AEC runs elections and referendums in accordance with legislation, and I note that many of the suggestions that you have made would require legislative change. I suggest raising them with your local member of parliament and/or senators.”  How do we get this legislation changed? 

A20: One Nation was successful in authoring election integrity legislation that was passed by the Morrison LNP Government. As a result, Australia now has election auditing mandated by legislation. That auditing is currently underway. 

Other reforms require support from the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) and One Nation is not a member. The review is underway into the 2022 Federal Election. Submissions have now closed. The next step is to see the recommendations and then prepare a further integrity bill to respond to the many issues raised.

Q21: Current AEC chief, Tom Rogers, is quoted saying “Citizens have the right to express views about democratic events that are a contest of ideas – the AEC does not restrict those freedoms.” Despite this, the AEC inappropriately took to social media in a ‘war’ against so-called ‘misinformation’ which amounted to suppression of free speech. How is this not illegal? 

A21: There was a lot of disinformation in the last election and I understand the AEC wanting to deal with that. Confidence in the result is essential for democracy. Having said that, the operation of the AEC around “disinformation” attracted a lot of criticism. One Nation is pursuing this matter to get a better balance into the process for the next election. 

Q22: Has the AEC got an opinion on the “Yes” campaign having a flood of taxpayer’s money to support it while the “No” campaign gets stuff-all? AEC states, “While we’ll be active in communicating about referendum processes, it’s up to voters to stop and consider information they see, hear or read from ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns.” Isn’t that the sort of “mistruth” Mr Tom Rogers should be “prebunking”? What do we hear from the AEC about the Yes-biased campaign? Crickets. 

A22: The AEC has so far followed it’s enabling legislation. It is the Albanese Government that is immorally trying to influence the referendum outcome by funding the ‘yes’ vote and not the ‘no’ vote. Please direct any feedback on this to the Albanese Government

Q23: Electoral reform needs to happen and it appears that while we run with the 2-party preferred system, we will never get another party into a majority position for change or reform. Minor parties will fight over the scraps. Reform will be difficult and part of the issue is the AEC. The question is who regulates the regulators? 

A23: The Australian people regulate the regulators by way of elections and referendums. If any Australian is unhappy with the outcome, please get involved – sign up as a candidate or poll worker and exercise your democratic rights before we lose them. 

Q24: The NSW Electoral Commission confirmed that no ballot boxes were to be removed from polling stations until after they were counted. Why were NSW Electoral Commission vested staff removing ballot boxes from booths? This is alleged to have occurred at 8 booths. AEC-vested staff are said to have walked around hospitals with iPads asking if people would like to vote. Country polling stations were being closed and electors asked to submit mail-in ballots.  

A24: One Nation has examined every video that was provided to us, or viewed on social media. Each of the videos show ballot boxes being removed from pre-poll centres correctly sealed and in the custody of AEC staff. We believe that no staff of the AEC should be moving ballots and instead, secure couriers with video surveillance on the load and GPS tracking should be used.

Can the seals be defeated? We are looking into this following multiple reports that this is possible, however we have not seen a video or statutory declaration indicating it is actually possible. 

Voting in nursing homes on iPads is acceptable if there are scrutineers in place. Based on our information, there were scrutineers and the count was accepted by those scrutineers. 

Closed voting centres are probably due to staffing issues, but if you have information regarding specific centres, please let us know via contact us.

Q25: At the 2023 NSW election, ballots were being mishandled. As confirmed by the NSWEC, they are only responsible for what occurs to the ballots up to and including 6 metres from the polling booth.  

A25: The AEC does not run NSW elections. As this is a state matter, you will need to contact the NSW Electoral Commission: https://elections.nsw.gov.au/contact-us

Q26: Why were there blank boxes above the line in the Senate ballot? 

A26: The wording of this section of the Electoral Act is poor and can be read to allow a blank name, which is what the AEC have done.

This decision disadvantages grouped independents as people are reticent to vote for a blank box.

The videos and audio recordings of AEC staff advising voters to not vote or worse, that they cannot vote in that square, are real and call into question training of the AEC staff. 

One Nation supports amending that provision of the Electoral Act to require grouped independents to be labelled as “grouped independent” and not be left blank. 

I receive a lot of constituent inquiries regarding election issues. My staff look into these and we created a file of potential electoral irregularities. I have been working through these potential issues with the AEC for three years, and still there are questions on the list. The AEC are doing a great job of running elections and a crap job of explaining irregularities when they occur.

Elections can always be more secure and more efficiently run. The AEC would be well advised to work with critics to solve these issues off these issues or explain them openly and honestly. I was pleased that Commissioner Rogers met with my staff and reviewed these issues a few weeks ago. I thank the Commissioner and his team for his time. As a result many old issues were explained to our satisfaction. Today I asked about those that were not adequately explained.

The answers today on the quality of the electoral roll for instance confirms our suspicions that there are 1.5m incorrect entries on the roll, based just on a data matching exercise against known databases – usually drivers licenses. It is One Nation’s position that only a physical audit can really get to the bottom of how many orphan or incorrect entries are padding out our electoral rolls. This is an urgent issue. A request for the last known proper audit that was promised at our meeting was sidestepped, so this is something I will pursue.

Answers also dealt with the question of why some people get postal vote applications they did not request in the name of previous residents of their premises. Postal vote applications are often made after a letterbox drop by a major party or activist organisation. Those postal vote applications are returned to the political party, who have, according to testimony, created their own voter database of these likely supporters. Are these groups submitting postal vote applications on behalf of voters without their knowledge, including voters who have moved on? This is a really dodgy way to do postal voting. Applications must go directly to the AEC to prevent this sort of voter interference.

Mr Rogers did provide assurance on other issues around ballot box security, and we look forward to getting an actual ballot box seal to test for ourselves. One Nation believes the best system for moving ballot boxes from temporary voting locations to the regional counting centre is a point to point professional courier with GPS locating so there can be no doubt the ballot box was secure in transit.

Regional counting centres should also be equipped with alarms and security cameras.

Finally I asked about the new audits that the AEC were required to have conducted as a result of legislation passed in the last Parliament as a result of One Nation’s actions. There seems to be some confusion on which audit we were talking about, so I will follow that up with a more detailed request.

These issues should in no way discourage Australians from voting or be taken to mean our elections are rigged in any way. Every Australian can have confidence Australia has amongst the world’s most accurate elections, however there is always room for improvement. We live in an internet age where one report can be amplified thousands of time to create an impression of impropriety that is not fair on the 100,000 Australians who help run our elections. More effort by the AEC to address these “internet rumours” is needed.

Click Here for Transcripts

PART 1

Senator Roberts: Thank you for being here again today. Firstly, Minister Farrell, thank you for  arranging the briefing by Mr Rogers and his team.

Senator Farrell: You’re always welcome, Senator, and if you have any other questions I’m sure the commissioner or his team would be very happy to help. And that invitation I extend to all senators.

Senator Roberts: We appreciate the briefing. We were very pleased with the briefing—the way it was conducted; the thoroughness of it. My apologies for not being there, but I got caught up in the Senate, I think, at the time. Anyway, the briefing was most helpful and cleared up a lot of questions that we had—a lot from constituents, of course. It’s very important for the AEC to have the confidence of the people of Australia in election results. I’ve got some follow-up questions, because constituents deserve an answer. It impacts on election credibility. In the meeting with my staff, you mentioned that the electoral rolls had been audited twice in the last 10 years, and I’d understood that the details of those audits would be sent through. We haven’t received them yet. Can you provide more details, please, of those audits?

Mr Rogers: I might just get Ms Gleeson to step up momentarily. I’ll follow up and find out what we said at that meeting and what we promised to provide, and we’ll provide whatever information we have on that.  But while I’ve got the floor, for the reasons that you said, it’s important, I think for Australians to have faith in the electoral system. It is great news, I think, that first of all the electoral roll is at 97.2 per cent completeness. It really is in many cases the envy of the democratic world, which is great. As to the processes that we have in place to ensure high integrity, Australians can be very satisfied with that. I think, in fact—I’m looking at Ms Gleeson—we put online every year the results of that.

Ms Gleeson: The Annual Roll Integrity Review is conducted yearly, and those results are available on the website.

Mr Rogers: And not only that. Every transaction we undertake with the roll—and there are millions on an annual basis—is an integrity transaction in any case. It’s interesting—it’s important, I should say—to reflect on what ‘integrity’ means with the roll, because there are two components for integrity which are very critical for us to think about. One is to make sure that only the individuals who should be on the roll are on the roll, and that’s a really critically important part. But the second part of integrity, internationally accepted, is to make sure that everyone who should be on the roll is included on the roll as well. So with those two metrics in mind—those two guardrails—over the last decade the AEC has gone to great extents to grow the roll and also to look at those aspects of the roll where individual groups have been underrepresented. As we said before, youth and Indigenous Australians have been traditionally underrepresented. We’ve been doing a lot of work in that regard, and we’re very satisfied with what we’ve done with that.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. Ms Gleeson, I want to understand the details of the audits on the rolls. I think the last ANAO audit of the Australian Electoral Commission was in 2013, with a report that came out two years later, in 2015. So could you please send the details that were promised at that meeting?

Mr Rogers: Yes, sure.

Ms Gleeson: Of course.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. We don’t know what it audited, what the specific findings were and what rolls were involved, and it was 10 years ago. This is a follow-up question regarding the new audit provided in section 273AA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act, requiring a substantive audit of the Australian Electoral Commission computer systems by an auditor accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate.. Can you confirm that that audit is underway, and do you have an expected return date, please?

Ms Gleeson: Senator, can you repeat the section of the act you’re referring to, please.

Senator Roberts: Section 2733AA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

Ms Gleeson: Section 273AA is an assurance of the security of computer systems for Senate scrutiny, or the IRAP assessment. This is an assessment conducted by a person or body accredited by ASD—that is, an IRAP assessor. It provides a draft report from the assessor with recommendations and identified risks. The AEC actions recommendations and implements appropriate mitigations to manage those risks, and a public statement is published on the AEC website stating a security risk assessment has been completed as required. For the 2022 federal election, accredited assessors completed security risk assessments of applicable systems prior to the federal election. Recommendations made were accepted by the AEC, and prior to the election appropriate mitigations were implemented to manage those risks, and a statement of assurance relating to those assessments was published on 19 May on the AEC website. I’m happy to provide the link to that statement.

Senator Roberts: Yes, please, if you could take that on notice. I’d like that link. I understand there are three audits. One is a software audit that audits the software used to allocate Senate preferences, which you passed. Another is an audit of the accuracy of scanning Senate ballot papers, which was passed as well. Mr Rogers, while you and your staff were most generous in giving your time, there was one issue the meeting did not get to, and that’s postal voting. My office received many reports of people receiving postal votes in the name of past residents in their premises—sometimes multiple ballots. I’m trying to understand the system to see if an improvement can be made or if indeed this is still best practice. This line of questioning is based on the number of reports of multiple ballots arriving at the same address in the name of residents who have not been there for years but who are still on the rolls. This suggests that a third party—maybe a political party or activists like GetUp—could be recording applications from the previous election and re-using that data to put in fake applications. Is it true that any voter can request a postal ballot by filling out the application and posting it to the Australian Electoral Commission, who ensure the person is on the rolls and, if so, send out a ballot?

Mr Rogers: I might start on that. Postal voting is a legislative part of the Australian electoral process. Not only that, it provides access to the vote for a large number of Australians who would otherwise—

Senator Roberts: We accept that.

Mr Rogers: be unable to achieve it. There is a process in place. Citizens are able to jump onto our website and make an application for a postal vote, or the way it has worked in elections is that political parties also send out applications. Regardless of where the application comes from, we do a thorough check of the information coming back, so no vote is included in the count—let me be more accurate: no elector’s vote is included in the count unless we’ve first assessed that they have an entitlement for that process. So it’s not so much about the information that goes out; it’s what comes back that’s the most critical part of that process. Perhaps Ms Gleeson might like to add to that.

Ms Gleeson: The process that Mr Rogers is referring to is preliminary scrutiny, which is a process outlined under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. That means that, when we receive back a completed postal vote, it goes through a process of checking that the information provided on the declaration certificate on the front of the postal vote is correctly completed in compliance with the Electoral Act. Then there is a check against the electoral roll to confirm that the elector is in fact enrolled and entitled for their vote to be counted. At that point, the vote is either accepted and progresses to further scrutiny or rejected and not opened.

Senator Roberts: Is it marked off once it’s accepted?

Ms Gleeson: Correct. If it is accepted it is marked off as that individual having voted.

Senator Roberts: The voter gets the application form by going to the website. Are there other ways?

Ms Gleeson: There are a range of ways that voters can access a postal vote application. Applications can be lodged online through our online postal voting application system, and the majority of voters do use that system.  There is also the option to use a paper form, which is available from our website or from AEC offices, and you’d be aware that there are also party postal vote applications, which the AEC does not issue but parties are entitled to issue under the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

Senator Roberts: So you don’t send out how-to-vote cards—sorry, postal vote application forms as a matter of course? You don’t letterbox drop; you don’t post them in the mail?

Ms Gleeson: No.

Senator Roberts: They can get them through political parties. So a political party can letterbox  postal vote applications, and, if completed by a voter, that application goes first to the political party and then to the AEC—is that correct?

Mr Rogers: That’s correct. Just to be very clear, though, because I know sometimes people get confused about that, political parties do not receive citizens’ votes. All they receive is the application form, which is then sent to us. The postal vote certificate, which includes the votes, is sent from AEC and never goes to the political parties.  It’s an important point to note because I know we get some complaints about that. And, only because you just mentioned it, Senator, I will deal at the same time with sending out how-to-vote cards. The AEC does not send out how-to-vote cards.

Senator Roberts: That was a slip of my tongue.

Mr Rogers: But sometimes we get that, and I might just opine on it, because I suspect what occasionally happens is that someone will receive possibly even a postal vote certificate from the AEC with their duly authorised postal vote, and, when they pick up the material from the letterbox and put it on their table, quite often there will be other material that’s distributed at election time. They’ll open the material and go, ‘Oh, my God, the AEC has distributed how-to-vote cards,’ because it’s on the list of materials. We do not ever distribute how-to-vote cards. It’s an important point.

Senator Roberts: There is a lot of distrust in the electorate right now because of what’s happened in the last three years. There’s been a lot of lost confidence in governments. So a political party can letterbox postal vote applications. What about the case of a renter, say, who’s just moved into his or her rental place and they’ve got five applications through the mail?

Mr Rogers: They might have received—

Senator Roberts: In different names.

Mr Rogers: I’m not aware of that, but they might have received five applications from different political parties or entities—but, again, what goes out is one thing. The important thing for us is what comes back and what we then mark off and that we then ensure that that voter has an entitlement to vote. It’s a legislative entitlement for political parties and entities to distribute postal vote applications. It’s actually enshrined in the Electoral Act. We have our own integrity measure for that coming back, and we’re confident that we’ve got processes in place that are robust.

Senator Roberts: Are there any rules around harvesting of the data by the political party?

Mr Rogers: What political parties do with the data they have is a matter for them. I know that all the political parties have databases that they use that are not controlled or contributed to by the AEC.

Senator Roberts: So can they go directly to the AEC if the applicant wants, or do they have to go through the party?

Mr Rogers: Not only that, Senator. I’m just expressing a personal preference here—I’m not annoying anyone—but if it were up to me I’d encourage citizens to come to the AEC website to apply for their postal vote application.

Senator Roberts: Chair, I am going to quickly read through some questions I’m going to submit on notice.  First, how many postal vote applications were received before the 2022 election? Second, of those, how many were duplicates—the same person applying more than once? Third, how many applications were refused after being checked on the electoral roll? Fourth, how many postal vote applications were approved and sent out? If not the same figure, please explain. Fifth, how many postal ballots were returned to the Australian Electoral Commission with a comment such as ‘not at this address’ or ‘didn’t request’, and, as a result, were any challenges issued to enrolled voters? Sixth, how many completed postal ballots were received back, whether in time to be counted or not? Seventh, how many people voted on polling day and then a postal vote was also received in their name? We’re just making sure that citizens can have confidence in the election.

Mr Rogers: We’ll provide that information. But just let me answer that last bit: citizens can have confidence in the election.

Senator Roberts: We’re getting a lot of questions that suggest they don’t. That may be due to the last three years; I don’t know.

Mr Rogers: Senator, we have one of the most transparent, robust electoral processes globally. On that, in terms of its transparency—because you raised the point that citizens need to have confidence, which we back up—we’ve given something like 12 hours of evidence at over 10 hearings since the election. We’ve submitted an untold number of submissions—43,000 words. At the election itself we made ourselves available for 400 media interviews, me included. We answered 4,000 media inquiries. Critically, one of those transparency measures was the 105,000 workers that we had who were members of the community, who were involved in every step of the process. Tens of thousands of party scrutineers were involved in that process. There was the fact that all the results were put online.  I know you know this, because you and I have spoken about this previously, but it’s always useful to remind citizens that there are so many transparency and integrity measures that underpin a really robust framework. Australian citizens should be rightly proud that we’ve got one of the most accessible electoral systems in the world, one of the most high-integrity systems and one of the most transparent. We’re very proud of that. A lot of that is due to the work of committees like this, with the legislation that buttresses the electoral system, but a lot of it also is the work of bureaucrats and members of the AEC over many, many electoral cycles, who have produced such outstanding results.  I know that you, as a member of parliament, won’t mind me saying that, because you’re aware of just how important it is that citizens do have confidence in the processes that exist. I know from time to time you ask these sorts of questions, but it’s important for me to respond that way so people understand that what we do is produce one of the world’s best electoral systems. Citizens should have great confidence in the outcomes of that process.

Senator Roberts: Thanks to your answers in past Senate estimates and our own research, on many of the questions that have been submitted to us—and we’ve had a number of topics covered—we can reassure people, which is important. There are some where we have not been able to reassure. The last election raised several issues that, bit by bit, have been resolved. The fact that we still get complaints, despite all the work you’ve done to publicise, shows how deeply entrenched that feeling is in the community.

Mr Rogers: Senator, it’s interesting—and I’m sorry for taking up your time here, but it’s worthwhile talking about that—that some of those many, many complaints, like things that we get, are not in any way tethered to the reality of the legislation or election delivery. We’re still getting stuff where people are telling us that we’re using Dominion voting machines. I’m sorry, I—

Senator Roberts: That’s an easy one.

Mr Rogers: But do you know what I mean?

Senator Roberts: I understand.

Mr Rogers: You’re talking about many complaints. If we get 10,000 people telling us we’re using Dominion voting machines, it’s irrelevant.

Senator Roberts: Yes.

Mr Rogers: That’s why it’s important for me to make those statements I made that we really do have one of the world’s best electoral systems and I’m very proud of the work that all of our staff have done. I know you’ll know this, but, every day in Australia, AEC staff do great work. We’re running close to, I think, 1,000 industrial elections of one sort or another a year. We’ve got 100,000 schoolkids most years pumping through the Electoral Education Centre here in Canberra. We’re looking after the roll. We’re working with our state colleagues. Every day, AEC staff are making a contribution to electoral integrity in Australia. It’s so important. I’m so proud of the team that support that outcome, and it’s important for the community to know that as well.

Chair: You do have to identify issues that affect the integrity of an election and respond accordingly, don’t you?

Mr Rogers: Absolutely, which is what we do on a very regular basis. Let me do another shout-out—it’s not just us; we’re supported by a range of other agencies who also assist with that matter of electoral integrity. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to say that, Senator. It’s just important for the community to understand that.

Chair: Can you think of an example, in 2013, when such an event happened?

Mr Rogers: Events like that are like a crucible, and they enable us to come out even better from the process, which is what we’ve done. It was an unfortunate circumstance in 2013. We went through a whole period afterwards analysing what we’ve done. Where we are today is significantly more advanced from that process as a result of—

Chair: As someone who lost their seat in that era, event or whatever you would call it, I express my confidence in the current processes. Thank you for your evidence today.

PART 2

Senator Roberts: The remaining questions go mostly to how ballots are moved. The movement of ballot papers continues to be something that constituents ask my office about a lot. The Australian Electoral Commission moves ballots from prepolls to regional counting centres as required to facilitate counting. Is that correct?

Mr Rogers: That’s correct.

Senator Roberts: The movement is done by AEC staff in private cars—their own cars, presumably. The ballot boxes are sealed and there is a movement log to control the process. Is that correct?

Mr Rogers: That’s correct. And each of the ballot boxes is sealed in the polling place in the presence of scrutineers. The seal numbers are recorded. So, that’s a tracked process.

Senator Roberts: Having scrutineered, I can verify that—for the actual location, not the movement. Can I have a sample of a movement log, please, with personal identifying information redacted?

Mr Rogers: No, Senator. The time for the asking of those questions was in the 40-day period after the conclusion of the election, where those records are retained and opened for people to examine. But in terms of movement logs, they are certifications that are, to provide a chain of custody, signed by the officers at each point of the process. It is inherently personal, with their names, signatures, and other issues, so I won’t provide that.

Senator Roberts: Okay. I accept that. Does the log have the time that the staff member left the prepoll location and the time the ballots were signed into the regional counting centre?

Mr Rogers: I’m not sure—possibly.

Senator Roberts: There is a possibility that they could be left in the car overnight in the driveway, for example?

Mr Rogers: No. The material is returned.

Senator Roberts: Yes, but what’s the time elapsed from when it’s removed, picked up, and when it’s deposited?

Mr Rogers: They leave the polling place and then go back to the outposted centre for the material to be collated and checked in.

Senator Roberts: Directly?

Mr Rogers: Directly.

Senator Roberts: Do you require staff who are transporting ballots to travel from point to point, so they’re required to go straight from the prepoll to the regional polling centre?

Mr Rogers: That’s generally the assumption.

Senator Roberts: It’s an assumption. Do you require that?

Ms Gleeson: As you can imagine, there are hundreds of thousands of logistics routes that ballot papers travel during the course of an event, and each movement of ballot papers is planned and is signed off by the appropriate supervisor at the AEC.

Senator Roberts: The actual route used?

Ms Gleeson: Yes. We do route planning, and there are exception processes if there’s—

Senator Roberts: A flood?

Ms Gleeson: a long route to be travelled and a documented reason as to why a long route needs to be travelled. Our documentation supports that and is appropriately signed off, but there are a number of permutations that the movement may take, depending on the complex logistics that the ballot papers have to travel.

Senator Roberts: Could concerns about the integrity of these ballots running around in private cars be alleviated by using secure point-to-point couriers equipped with GPS, as couriers are these days?

Mr Pope: I don’t think there’d be enough trucks in Australia—I’m serious.

Mr Rogers: We’re talking about 8,000 polling places. We’ve already got 105,000 staff. Quite often these movements occur late in the evening. Effectively, that’s a process that’s used not only at federal elections but also at state elections and has been used for 120 years without any mishaps. So, I’m very confident in the processes we’ve got in place.

Senator Roberts: So, it’s not a matter of cost, because the minister’s just allocated $364 million for a referendum. It’s about logistics.

Mr Rogers: It would be a huge matter of cost, let alone of whether there is actually that number of trucks available at that time in Australia in those locations to do it.

Senator Roberts: That’s what Mr—Price, is it?—said.

Mr Rogers: Pope.

Mr Pope: Pope.

Senator Roberts: Pope—sorry. Have you personally examined the seal the AEC uses to seal the ballot box? Have you tried to open it without detection and generally assured yourself that it’s fit for purpose?

Mr Rogers: As it happens, I have.

Senator Roberts: Good.

Mr Rogers: I’m very happy with those seals, and I’m very happy with the process that we have in place.

Senator Roberts: Can I have one to examine?

Mr Rogers: Sure.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. Maybe that’s a perfect video topic for you to quell any lack of confidence.  For clarity, please: videos showing the movement of ballot boxes posted online appear to show four seals on a ballot box. Is that correct?

Mr Rogers: I haven’t seen the video that you’re talking about, Senator.

Ms Gleeson: We have a range of types of ballot box, Senator. It depends on which one you’re referring to.

Senator Roberts: Okay. Each of the seals has a unique number?

Ms Gleeson: Correct.

Senator Roberts: All seals are accounted for at the end of the count?

Mr Rogers: They’re accounted for in the process of movement. They’re recorded at the point of departure.  They’re recorded at the point of arrival. So, in that sense, they’re accounted for.

Senator Roberts: Were any missing in the 2022 federal election, and were any duplicate seals, fake seals or boxes with broken seals detected?

Mr Rogers: No, absolutely not.

Senator Roberts: Do you do a reconciliation on ballot papers printed and ballot papers accounted for at the end of the process?

Mr Rogers: Yes, we do.

Senator Roberts: What was the figure in May ’22 for unders or overs? Zero would be impossible, of course; we understand the logistics effort. There had to be some variance. What is that variance?

Ms Gleeson: Could you clarify what you mean by ‘unders’ and ‘overs’, please, Senator.

Senator Roberts: Well, comparing ballot papers printed and ballot papers accounted for, sometimes one would be higher than the other. So what is that variance?

Ms Gleeson: We don’t have that to hand.

Senator Roberts: No, you wouldn’t have it here.

Mr Rogers: Let me take that on notice, Senator.

Senator Roberts: That’s fine. Thank you. Are watermarks on a ballot paper a feasible security option?

Ms Gleeson: Our ballot papers are watermarked, Senator.

Senator Roberts: Okay. That shows you I don’t pay much attention! Close enough!

Ms Gleeson: It’s deliberately difficult to detect, perhaps, but very obvious to electoral administrators.

Senator Roberts: This is just a matter of curiosity: are you examining online voting? I know some university academics have a system for secure online voting using blockchain technology. Minister or Mr Rogers?

Mr Rogers: Well, Senator, it’s a very interesting question, but, if you wanted a very short answer, the answer would be no. For us, paper based voting has a number of security aspects that are almost impossible to replicate online. But I guess there is a point at which, at some point in the future, supply of paper and printing is going to be an issue for Australia in the sort of quantities that we’re talking about. We’re not there yet, but, at a point, that will need to be looked at. But, just to be very clear, we’re not examining any online or electronic voting system for use in any federal election, referendum or by-election.

Senator Roberts: I’m with you. I like the paper system. It’s very hard to corrupt, because there are always people around. Will you be using scanning to count the referendum, or a manual count?

Mr Rogers: A manual count.

Senator Roberts: That’s why the cost is so high—$364 million.

Mr Rogers: Handcrafted.

Senator Roberts: Sorry?

Mr Rogers: Handcrafted.

Senator Roberts: Ha, ha! And how will scrutineers be picked? It’s not a matter of parties having scrutineers they can put them forward but some people loosely on a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ campaign. How will you select scrutineers?

Mr Rogers: The legislation is slightly different for the appointment of scrutineers at a referendum. It can be through the registered officers of political parties, but the state governors and the Governor-General can also appoint scrutineers. That’s pretty much the process, I think.

Mr Pope: The state governors and the Governor-General can appoint an authorised person who can appoint those scrutineers on their behalf.  But, just to be precise around your question, it’s got nothing to do with us. It’s not our appointment.

Senator Roberts: I know. That’s what I’m getting at: who does it? I didn’t think you’d be appointing them.

Mr Pope: Oh, I thought you said, ‘How are you appointing scrutineers?’

Senator Roberts: I’m sorry. I meant: how will you allow scrutineers in?

Mr Rogers: Again, the registered officers of registered political parties, state governors and the Governor-General.

Senator Roberts: Thank you.