Australia co-operated with the Wuhan Institute and America’s NIH on gain-of-function research on COVID, which led to the COVID pandemic. Subsequently, both of these institutes conducted similar research on bird flu and now we have a mutant bird flu outbreak.
When I asked the Health Department if this was a good reason to discontinue gain-of-function research, their response was NO and instead, indicated a focus on refining messaging to deflect criticism. Even more troubling is the admission that gain-of-function research into pandemic-potential pathogens is being conducted in level 3 labs rather than level 4.
One Nation opposes gain-of-function research and believes that the “scientists” responsible for developing the novel COVID virus should be held accountable for the deaths it caused. Gain-of-function research for pandemic-potential pathogens does not pass a cost-benefit-risk analysis and should be halted immediately.
Transcript
Senator ROBERTS: Minister, China did gain-of-function research in Wuhan on COVID, and we had a COVID outbreak. Then China did gain-of-function research on bird flu, and now we have a bird flu outbreak, so I’m told. Minister, will your government ban Australian involvement in gain-of-function research?
Senator Gallagher: I think Professor Kelly has stated the Australian government’s position in relation to reviews that are underway. I don’t know whether there’s more that he can add to that.
Prof. Kelly: I’d just suggest that be directed to the CEO of the NHMRC, who’s undertaken some of these processes previously, and we’ve had a recent discussion about what else we might need to think about.
Senator ROBERTS: Thank you.
Prof. Wesselingh: Gain-of-function research is an important component of genomic research across the board and leads the development of a whole lot of things, like drugs and vaccines et cetera. I think the issue that you’re talking about is the gain-of-function research on pandemic potential pathogens and, obviously, that does need to be closely regulated. Australia has a very strong regulatory environment to do that, particularly through the OGTR, biosafety committees across the country and, obviously, the facilities we have, which are PC3 and PC4 facilities.
Senator ROBERTS: Are they levels or standards for infection security?
Prof. Wesselingh: Yes. PC2 is a sort of standard laboratory, PC3 is additional security and PC4 is very high security.
Senator ROBERTS: And ours are 2 and 3?
Prof. Wesselingh: No. All of the work done on gain-of-function in PC3 and PC4 is on pandemic potential pathogens. We have, I think, a really strong regulatory environment to control gain-of-function research in Australia. But as Paul said, we’ve had some additional conversations between the Chief Medical Officer, the OGTR and the NHMRC, in terms of whether there are additional assurances that we should apply to the very small number of gain-of-function activities that occur with these pandemic potential pathogens. We’re certainly looking at that to see the risk benefit and the public benefit of those aspects.
Senator ROBERTS: Has research stopped while you’re doing that review?
Prof. Wesselingh: No. We did a very big review of gain-of-function activities, and that has been reported to this committee previously. There were 17 projects that were being conducted. Only four were being conducted with pandemic potential pathogens, and they were all conducted under the controls of the OGTR in PC3 and PC4 facilities; none were being done on COVID; and we continue to use the current regulatory processes in regard to that.
Senator ROBERTS: What is the status of gain-of-function research in the United States? I understand that it was outlawed under Obama.
Prof. Kelly: I’m not really able to talk about what may or may not be the regulations in a foreign country.
Senator ROBERTS: Do you do much benchmarking with other countries?
Prof. Wesselingh: I can comment on that. Gain-of-function research still continues in the United States. We have been watching, with interest, recent developments in the United States, and they have developed a system, similar to the one that I was saying we are currently discussing with the chief health officer, where gain-offunction research can continue; but increased assurances, in terms of the risk-benefit and the public benefit of those activities, are conducted through the US agencies. We’re looking at that carefully, and that’s the basis for our ongoing discussions with the OGTR and the Chief Medical Officer
